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Copyright and the First Amendment exist in tension. The Supreme Court acknowledges 
this tension but contends that copyright law resolves it with two built-in free speech safe-
guards: (1) by protecting only the expression of ideas and not the ideas themselves (the 
idea/expression dichotomy); and (2) by allowing the use of expression under certain cir-
cumstances (the fair use doctrine). The problem is that these doctrines are notoriously va-
gue, so users often cannot know ex ante whether their uses will be immune from liability. 
This unpredictably might be tolerable if users could be confident that, if they were subject to 
liability, any damage award would be limited to a reasonable licensing fee or a share of 
profits attributable to the infringement. But copyright law allows plaintiffs to opt for statu-
tory damages instead of compensatory or restitutionary damages, and statutory damages 
can sometimes be punitive and even grossly excessive. 
 This combined uncertainty—of not knowing whether a use will be immunized from lia-
bility and what the penalty will be if it is not—means that the idea/expression and fair use 
doctrines are underutilized. Yet if these doctrines are what resolve copyright’s tension with 
the First Amendment, they need to be sufficiently viable so that users can confidently rely on 
them. One solution is to make the fair use and idea/expression doctrines more predictable, 
but this has proven largely illusory. Another is to modify the statutory damages regime to 
ensure that awards are better calibrated so as not to chill speech. This latter solution, which 
has not been methodically explored in the literature, is the focus of this Article. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION
 Copyright and the First Amendment exist in tension. The First 
Amendment says Congress shall make “no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech.”1 Yet congressionally-enacted copyright laws do 
just that. They penalize speech acts such as publishing, performing, 
singing, or creating derivative works.2 Of course, copyrights “abridge” 
only the right to use someone else’s expression, which, as Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg has suggested, greatly mitigates their impact 
on freedom of speech.3 But copyrights still abridge speech and some-
times seriously threaten First Amendment interests. 
 Consider Diebold’s attempt to stop the posting of employee e-mails 
indicating that the company’s voting machines were vulnerable to 
fraud.4 While these e-mails were not works of literature, they could 
still possess the “minimal degree of creativity” required for copyrigh-
tability.5 And, as messages composed by employees in the scope of 
their employment, Diebold would own the rights to them.6 But should 
this simple fact of Diebold’s copyright ownership give Diebold the 
right to deny the public access to these important messages? Or is 
there a countervailing First Amendment interest that trumps Di-
ebold’s property rights? 
 Consider also the efforts of Margaret Mitchell’s estate to enjoin 
the publication of The Wind Done Gone, a novel that took the charac-
ters and setting of Gone with the Wind but told the story from a 
slave’s perspective.7 The executors of the Mitchell estate understand-
ably wanted publication of this critical treatment of Mitchell’s book 
enjoined. But should the mere fact of their copyright ownership per-
mit them to suppress criticism of an American icon? 
 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that copyright law abridges 
speech.8 But its time-honored response is to dismiss any First 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (providing the copyright owner with the “exclusive 
rights” of reproducing the copyrighted work, preparing derivative works, and so forth). 
 3. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).  
 4. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1197-98 (N.D.  
Cal. 2004). 
 5. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (stating that 
the requisite level of creativity for copyrightability is “extremely low” and that “even a 
slight amount will suffice”). 
 6. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000). 
 7. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259, 1270 (11th  
Cir. 2001). 
 8. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.  
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Amendment concerns based on what the Court calls copyright’s 
“built-in” free speech safeguards: the idea/expression dichotomy and 
the fair use doctrine.9 The idea/expression dichotomy ensures that 
copyright does not trench upon the marketplace of ideas by providing 
that authors obtain rights only in expression, not ideas.10 The fair use 
doctrine supplements this free speech protection by allowing even 
expression to be used in certain circumstances when there is minimal 
harm to a copyright owner and a valuable public benefit.11
 The Court’s faith that these doctrines resolve any conflict between 
the First Amendment and copyright is understandable. Quite often, 
they do. Thus, the trial court in Diebold found the e-mail postings to 
be a fair use.12 And the Eleventh Circuit in The Wind Done Gone case 
held that the plaintiffs could not enjoin the publication of the defen-
dant’s book.13
 But this reconciliation is not as tidy as it seems. Diebold initially 
succeeded in getting some service providers to remove the e-mail 
postings from the Internet.14 It was only with the help of the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation and the Stanford Cyberlaw Clinic that 
the right to post the messages was judicially vindicated.15 Similarly, a 
district court judge initially enjoined further publication of The Wind 
Done Gone novel until the Eleventh Circuit reversed.16
 Part of the problem is that the lines between idea and expression 
and fair and unfair use are notoriously vague.17 Of course, it is some-
times easy to know when one is taking just an idea. If Romeo and 
Juliet was copyrighted, no one would contend that Shakespeare could 
stop other authors from using the plot of boy-meets-girl-and-falls-in-
 9. See id. at 219; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
549, 556 (1985). 
 10. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219. 
 11. Id.; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579, 590 (1994) 
(noting that important factors in a fair use analysis include whether a use adds something 
new and whether it harms the market or potential market for a copyrighted work). 
 12. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2004) 
(finding “the portions of the email archive discussing possible technical problems” subject 
to fair use). 
 13. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1275-77 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 14. Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1198 (noting that Swarthmore College required the 
students to remove the e-mail postings from the Internet). 
 15. See id. at 1204-05; see also Electronic Fontier Foundation, 
http://www.eff.org/cases/online-policy-group-v-diebold (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) (describ-
ing the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Stanford Center for Internet and Society  
Cyberlaw Clinic’s successful representation of the Swarthmore students who posted the 
email messages and the Internet service provider, Online Policy Group, that refused to 
take down the messages). 
 16. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1259. 
 17. David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 266 (2003) (describing the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use 
doctrine as “transcendental distinctions”). 
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love, even if they had access to Shakespeare’s work.18 And this would 
be true even if the lovers were from quarreling clans. Thus, the mak-
ers of The Cohens and the Kellys, or the more contemporary Meet the 
Fockers, could confidently produce their works without Shakespeare’s 
permission.19 But there are other instances in which it is less clear 
whether Shakespeare’s permission would be required. Professor 
Nimmer, for instance, has suggested that the makers of West Side 
Story would have needed Shakespeare’s permission to use Romeo and 
Juliet.20 Yet if this were true, perhaps the creators of The Wind Done 
Gone, which more closely tracks the storyline and characters of the 
underlying work than West Side Story tracks Romeo and Juliet,
would need the Mitchell estate’s permission.21
 Fair use can be similarly murky.22 Surely, no one questions the 
right of a commentator to quote a short passage from a novel in a 
book review. But the extent to which a new author can fairly borrow 
from another work is often far from clear. For example, whether the 2 
Live Crew parody of the Roy Orbison song “Oh, Pretty Woman” was a 
fair use was litigated all the way up to the Supreme Court,23 and 
even then the Court remanded for further fact-finding.24 Other fair 
use claims can be similarly unpredictable.25
 In other First Amendment contexts, one would expect the inherent 
vagueness of the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine 
to set off alarm bells. After all, First Amendment jurisprudence is rife 
with warnings about the chilling effects of vague laws on freedom of 
speech.26 But courts do not find the murkiness of these copyright doc-
 18. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (1930) (stating that the 
basic plot structure of Romeo and Juliet is not copyrightable). 
 19. Id. (stating that a comedy based on parental objections to the marriage of a Jewish 
boy and Irish girl is “no more susceptible of copyright than the outline of Romeo  
and Juliet”). 
 20. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.03[A][1][b] (Matthew Bender ed., 2009). 
 21. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1259 (noting that the defendant’s book copied core 
characters, traits, and relationships from Gone with the Wind).
 22. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 185-86 (2007) [hereinafter Lemley, Licensing] (“Because fair 
use relies upon a vague, multi-factor test, it is often impossible to know ex ante whether 
any particular use will qualify as fair.”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair 
Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1485 (2007) (noting that “fair use’s ability to shield un-
authorized users is greatly undermined by the uncertainty that has become the hallmark 
of the doctrine”); R. Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public Val-
ues, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 426-27 (2005) (commenting on the “ ‘know it when you see it’ 
nature” of a fair use analysis). 
 23. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 571-72 (1994). 
 24. Id. at 593-94. 
 25. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107 
(1990) (stating that fair use decisions “are not governed by consistent principles” and “re-
flect widely differing notions of the meaning of fair use”).  
 26. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 871-74 (1997) (invalidating 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 on vagueness grounds); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 
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trines problematic. Indeed, they seem to revel in it. Judge Learned 
Hand famously observed that the line between borrowing an idea and 
taking expression must “inevitably be ad hoc.”27 Justice David Souter 
similarly remarked that a fair use analysis cannot “be simplified with 
bright-line rules” but “calls for [a] case-by-case analysis.”28
 One might debate whether these judges should have tolerated this 
vagueness, but the judges were at least being honest. They knew 
from experience that it is often impossible to remove the murkiness 
from a fair use or idea/expression analysis. They also probably rea-
lized that if they reduced the doctrines to more predictable rules (for 
example, designating as fair the use of seven seconds of a film clip 
but not eight), it would do a disservice to those with credible fair use 
or idea/expression claims that do not fit within the rigid guidelines.29
Murkiness, in other words, has its benefits.30
 But murkiness still chills speech.31 A documentary filmmaker may 
decide not to use another’s film clips if she can’t be certain her taking 
will be a fair use.32 And insurance companies may be unwilling to in-
sure the film, which may be necessary for its distribution, if there are 
unresolved fair use claims.33
 Fortunately, there may be another way to avoid this chilling effect 
while still preserving the needed discretion in the fair use and 
idea/expression doctrines. The solution is to modify the remedies 
available whenever a party loses an honestly asserted fair use or 
idea/expression defense. If the copyright owner’s remedies are limited 
566, 567-68 (1974) (finding flag desecration law unconstitutionally vague); Stromberg v. 
California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931) (setting aside conviction based on law forbidding 
displays in opposition to organized government and holding the law unconstitutionally 
vague). See generally 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH
§ 6:15, at 6-21 (2008) (noting that, “[i]n the First Amendment area, the Supreme Court has 
traditionally applied the vagueness doctrine with special exactitude, because of the chilling 
effect that vague laws may have on protected expression”). 
 27. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (1960). 
 28. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. 
 29. See id. at 578-94 (repeatedly rejecting the propriety of any hard line rules—that 
parody is always a fair use, that commercial use is never a fair use, or that copying the 
“heart” of a work is not a fair use—and opting for a close contextual balancing of the facts). 
 30. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1990) (doubting that efforts to reduce fair use to more predictable prin-
ciples will ever be successful and preferring instead a fact-specific inquiry in each case).  
 31. See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 22, at 1486 (noting that the “Supreme 
Court’s decision to favor ex post fairness over ex ante certainty comes at a steep cost for 
potential users of copyrighted works” and results in “overdeterrence”). 
 32. See MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE? FREE EXPRES-
SION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL 5-6 (2005) (noting that most filmmakers in our 
“clearance culture” try to “get permission for everything,” which “means that a lot of foo-
tage is cut because permissions are unavailable or too expensive, or copyright owners can’t 
be found”). 
 33. See id. at 5 (noting that “errors and omissions” policies (E&O) require “permission 
for every snippet of film, photographs, music, or text that is used” and that no cable or 
broadcast station or distribution company “will release anything without E&O insurance”). 
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in these instances to only reasonable compensatory damages, then 
potential users might be willing to forge ahead even if they are un-
sure whether a fair use or idea/expression defense will prevail. 
 The Copyright Act’s traditional remedies—actual damages plus a 
defendant’s nonduplicative profits—do just this.34 These remedies are 
largely limited to providing a plaintiff with fair compensation, such 
as a reasonable licensing fee, or forcing a defendant to disgorge any 
ill-gotten gains attributable to the infringement.35 The remedies are 
compensatory and restitutionary, not punitive, so they are unlikely to 
greatly deter potential users from forging ahead with reasonable al-
beit debatable fair uses or from taking what are arguably just 
ideas.36
 The problem is that the Copyright Act also allows plaintiffs to opt 
for statutory damages in lieu of actual damages and profits.37 And, 
unlike the remedies for actual damages and profits, statutory dam-
ages can be punitive.38 The Act simply provides that statutory dam-
age awards can be anywhere from $750 to $30,000 for each work in-
fringed and provides no guidance as to how a fact finder should set 
the amount.39 Moreover, the award may be increased to up to 
$150,000 if an infringement is found to be “willful,” a term not de-
fined in the Act and expansively interpreted by the courts.40
 Of course, the discretion built into the statutory damages regime 
permits fact finders to limit an award to an amount that approx-
imates a plaintiff’s actual damages and profits. But the problem is 
that it is difficult for users to know ex ante whether their liability 
exposure will be limited to a plaintiff’s compensatory and restitutio-
nary interest or whether it will include a punitive component.41 It is 
this potential liability for punitive damages that chills prospective 
users of copyrighted works. For it is one thing to think that you will 
be subject to a reasonable license fee if your fair use defense fails. It 
is quite another to think that you will be subject to punitive damages. 
 This problem of statutory damages’ unpredictability is magnified 
when it is combined with the murkiness of the fair use and 
idea/expression doctrines. For if courts are to hold that these doc-
trines resolve the tension between copyright and the First Amend-
ment, they must surely believe that these defenses are sufficiently 
viable for users to rely on them. But prospective users will most like-
 34. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006). 
 35. See infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text. 
 36. See infra notes 197-204 and accompanying text. 
 37. § 504(c). 
 38. See infra notes 127-34 and accompanying text. 
 39. Id.
 40. § 504(c)(2); see also infra notes 71-73. 
 41. See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 22, at 1486-87 (noting that a user can 
face “quite substantial” damages if a fair use defense fails). 
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ly steer clear of all but the most conservative uses if they do not know 
in advance whether their uses are lawful (because of the murkiness 
of the fair use and idea/expression doctrines) or what the penalty will 
be for guessing wrong (because of the unpredictability of statutory 
damages).42 This would be fine if the sole concern of copyright law is 
to bolster copyright owners’ property rights. But it is problematic if it 
results in copyright owners getting a greater monopoly over speech 
than is appropriate under the First Amendment.43
 If the balance between copyright law and the First Amendment 
depends upon the ability of users to confidently rely on the fair use 
and idea/expression defenses, an adjustment must be made to ensure 
that users are not afraid to invoke these defenses. One option is to 
reduce the murkiness of the fair use and idea/expression doctrines. In 
fact, many scholars have tried to do just that.44 They recommend, for 
instance, that industries develop fair use guidelines with the hope 
that courts will adopt them.45 Other scholars propose creating new 
administrative bodies that would render prompt and binding fair use 
opinions in advance of someone’s use of a copyrighted work.46
 These suggestions are certainly commendable and in some in-
stances could help encourage prospective users to take advantage of 
the fair use and idea/expression doctrines. But, as noted above, re-
ducing these doctrines to rigid guidelines ultimately may be either 
impossible or undesirable.47 And having an administrative body re-
solve fair use issues in advance may be more cumbersome and expen-
sive than one would hope. An administrative process would likely 
 42. See id. at 1486 (stating that the overdeterrence problem caused by the fair use 
doctrine’s murkiness is “compounded” by the “wide arsenal of remedies the law provides to 
copyright owners” including statutory damages); see also Stephanie Berg, Remedying the 
Statutory Damages Remedy for Secondary Copyright Infringement Liability: Balancing Copy-
right and Innovation in the Digital Age, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 314-15 (2009) 
(pointing out that the combination of uncertainty in an inventor’s secondary liability for copy-
right infringement and the threat of statutory damages can impede technological innovation). 
 43. See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 22, at 1491-92 (noting that American 
copyright law “views protecting authors’ rights not as an end unto itself” but as “the means 
to produce a more robust intellectual and artistic culture”).  
 44. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 22, at 1503-18 (reviewing previous 
attempts to create clear fair use guidelines and proposing their own bright-line safe harbor 
rules); see also, e.g., Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1525, 1530 (2004) (proposing a fair use analysis that focuses on whether a 
use is “consistent with a provable social or cultural pattern of conduct”).  
 45. See, e.g., AMERICAN UNIV. WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW CTR. FOR SOCIAL MEDIA,
DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE (2005),
http://centerforsocialmedia.org/sites/default/files/fair_use_final.pdf. 
 46. See generally Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1090
(2007) (advocating the creation of a “Fair Use Board” in the U.S. Copyright Office that 
could issue ex ante decisions on whether a use of a copyrighted work would be a fair use). 
 47. See HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 32, at 7 (criticizing existing fair use guidelines 
because they “relinquish the breadth and flexibility of fair use” for the “interests of security 
and uniformity”). 
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place a heavy financial burden on low budget artists and filmmakers 
who make many small but debatably “fair” uses. 
 Another way to address these problems is to tinker with copy-
right’s remedial regime, specifically statutory damages. After all, the 
murkiness of the fair use and idea/expression doctrines would not be 
as troublesome if prospective users knew that their potential liability 
for losing on these grounds was limited to a copyright owner’s rea-
sonable compensation.  
 The solution is to design a statutory damages regime that is better 
calibrated to protect speech interests. That is what I hope to achieve 
in this Article. To help determine what this calibration should be, I 
turn to the theoretical distinction between property rules and liabili-
ty rules developed by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed in 
their landmark article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedral.48 Other scholars have applied Cala-
bresi and Melamed’s insights to intellectual property, particularly to 
the propriety of injunctive relief for violations of intellectual property 
rights.49 But, to date, most scholars have not applied Calabresi and 
Melamed’s insights to evaluate methodically copyright’s damages re-
gime, specifically statutory damages.50
 My analysis demonstrates that the remedies available to copy-
right owners need to vary depending upon the way in which a work is 
infringed. In some instances, it is appropriate to give copyright own-
ers strong “property rule” protection that reinforces their right to ex-
clude others from using their works without permission.51 This is 
particularly true when infringers engage in acts of pure piracy or 
create derivative works that exploit markets traditionally reserved to 
the owners of the underlying works. Copyright owners should be en-
titled to the most robust types of remedies in these instances of egre-
gious piracy. They should be able to enjoin the infringement and 
should have an opportunity to receive statutory damages that are not 
only compensatory but also punitive in order to deter the defendant 
and others from engaging in this type of infringing behavior.  
 48. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 49. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability 
Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783 (2007) (discussing the need for a liability 
rule in intellectual property law so as to protect underlying noninfringing conduct). 
 50. The one exception is Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of 
Damages Rules in Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1585 (1998). These 
authors acknowledge that copyright statutory damages may greatly exceed a copyright 
owner’s actual damages but suggest that this “threat” of large statutory damages may be 
needed to “prevent the value of the owner’s copyright from being destroyed by a multitude 
of small-scale infringing acts.” Id. at 1657. The authors do not focus on the in terrorem
effect that punitive statutory damages can have on actors with plausible fair use claims or 
claims that they have merely taken ideas. 
 51. See infra note 224 and accompanying text. 
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 In other instances, copyright owners should be entitled only to 
weaker “liability rule” protection that effectively permits others to 
use a work without permission as long as they are willing to pay a 
reasonable fee for doing so.52 Unlike a property rule’s powerful mes-
sage not to trespass on a copyrighted work, a liability rule invites 
prospective users to use a work for what is essentially a judicially-
created compulsory license. Infringers should be able to continue ex-
ploiting their derivative works (that is, copyright owners should not 
be able to enjoin these uses) and, while the infringers may have to 
pay compensatory or restitutionary damages to the copyright owners, 
they should not be liable for punitive damages. 
 Of course, it may seem odd to encourage people to use another’s 
copyrighted work without permission as long as they pay a reasona-
ble fee. After all, the law does not allow a stranger to use another’s 
beach house as long as he pays a reasonable rent. But copyrights are 
created pursuant to a constitutional grant authorizing Congress to 
create rights only for the purpose of benefiting the public.53 And copy-
rights, unlike real property rights, create rights in speech, thereby 
placing them in tension with the First Amendment. Allowing third 
parties to occasionally use copyrighted works without permission is 
necessary to fulfill Congress’ mandate to benefit the public and en-
sure that copyrights do not unduly trench upon free speech interests. 
 After identifying the overarching principles for awarding mone-
tary damages, I shall propose guidelines for determining when statu-
tory damages should serve a punitive or deterrent purpose and when 
they should be limited to merely a compensatory or restitutionary 
purpose. In the Article’s final section, I explore three routes for im-
plementing the proposed guidelines. The first asks whether courts 
could implement the guidelines through interpretation of the current 
statutory damages provision, thus avoiding any need for legislative 
intervention. The second explores how Congress could amend the 
Copyright Act to create more precise rules for awarding statutory 
damages. Finally, the last section explores whether the First 
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause or the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause should place constitutional limits on statutory dam-
ages. These constitutional options are particularly attractive if politi-
cal opposition from the copyright industries makes legislative modifi-
cation of the statutory damages regime improbable.54
 52. See infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text. 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power to enact copyright laws 
“[t]o promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts”). Further, in Mazer v. Stein, the 
Supreme Court explained that the “economic philosophy” underlying this Clause is that 
“encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public wel-
fare through the talents of authors.” 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
 54. See infra notes 251-57 and accompanying text. 
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II.  THE FRAMEWORK: THE COPYRIGHT ACT’S STATUTORY DAMAGES 
REGIME
 The standard measure of recovery for copyright infringement con-
sists of “actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer.”55
Actual damages comprise any damages suffered by the plaintiff as a 
result of the infringement.56 The defendant-infringer’s profits are re-
coverable if they are attributable to the infringement and are not 
merely duplicative of the plaintiff’s actual damages.57
 Imagine, for instance, a defendant who unlawfully reproduced a 
plaintiff’s photograph on 1000 t-shirts and then sold the shirts. The 
plaintiff might claim actual damages because the defendant usurped 
the plaintiff’s market for selling t-shirts (that is, the plaintiff could 
have sold 1000 shirts with the photo instead of the defendant). Alter-
natively, the plaintiff might seek to recover the profits received by 
the defendant from selling the 1000 shirts. The plaintiff cannot re-
cover both of these amounts, however, because the two are largely 
duplicative.58 By contrast, if the defendant’s crass commercial exploi-
tation diminished the market value of the plaintiff’s photograph, 
then the plaintiff may have incurred actual damages that are not re-
flected in the defendant’s profits.59
 Actual damages and profits are the default measure of monetary 
recovery under the Copyright Act but not the only measure. The Act 
also allows plaintiffs to opt for “statutory damages” in lieu of actual 
damages and profits at any time before the final judgment.60 Statuto-
ry damages are monetary awards that fall within a range set forth in 
the Copyright Act. These damages are available as long as a copy-
right owner has registered his or her copyright prior to the infringe-
ment or, when a published work is infringed, within three months of 
the work’s publication.61
 55. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (2006). 
 56. See § 504(b) (stating that the “copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual 
damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement”). 
 57. Id. (stating that a copyright owner may recover “any profits . . . that are attributa-
ble to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages”). 
 58. See, e.g., Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1120-22 (7th Cir. 1983) (overturning 
award of both actual damages and defendant’s profits and awarding only actual damages 
because plaintiff had failed to show that the two were not duplicative). See generally  
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 20, § 14.02[A][1], at 14-16 (explaining that a plaintiff “may 
not recover its full lost profits plus all of the defendant’s profits, for this would constitute a 
forbidden double recovery”). 
 59. See, e.g., Rainey v. Wayne State Univ., 26 F. Supp. 2d 963, 970 (E.D. Mich. 1998) 
(claim for reputational harm caused by the upside down reproduction of a painting). 
 60. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006). 
 61. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006). 
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 The Copyright Act allows plaintiffs to receive one statutory dam-
age award for each work infringed.62 The amount awarded can be an-
ywhere from $750 to $30,000.63 In addition, courts may increase the 
maximum statutory damage award up to $150,000 if they conclude 
an infringement was “committed willfully.”64 Conversely, they may 
reduce the minimum damage amount to $200 if they conclude an in-
fringement was innocent.65
 For example, a defendant who unlawfully downloaded ten songs 
could potentially be liable for statutory damages of $750 to $30,000 
for each work infringed.66 If the infringement is found to be willful, 
the damages could be as high as $150,000 for each work.67 By con-
trast, if a defendant made 1000 copies of a single song, the plaintiff 
may recover only one statutory damage award because only one work 
was infringed.68 Of course, a court may compensate for the magnitude 
of the infringement by choosing an award on the high end of the sta-
tutorily-set spectrum. But the plaintiff may still receive only  
one award. 
 The Copyright Act provides no guidance on how fact finders 
should set the amount of a statutory damage award, and courts have 
emphasized that they have “wide discretion” in doing so.69 While 
courts have identified factors to consider in making awards, scholars 
who have studied the actual awards have found them to be arbitrary 
and unpredictable.70
 62. § 504(c). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. § 504(c)(2). 
 65. Id. 
 66. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1048 (D. 
Minn. 2010) (statutory damages of $2,250 for each of twenty-four songs downloaded and 
distributed on a peer-to-peer network for a total of $54,000). This award was granted by a 
judge on remittitur after a jury first awarded $80,000 for each song for a total statutory 
damages award of $1,920,000. Id. at 1050. 
 67. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc. 
259 F.3d 1186, 1191 (9th Cir. 2001) (jury award of $31.68 million for 440 infringed works 
or the equivalent of $72,000 for each work). 
 68. § 504(c) (stating that a plaintiff may receive an award of statutory damages “for 
all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, for which any one 
infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly 
and severally”). 
 69. See Berg, supra note 42, at 305 (noting that the act provides no guidance as to how 
courts should exercise their discretion); see also Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Dragon Pac. Int’l, 
40 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that a district court “has wide discretion in set-
ting the amount of statutory damages”); Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 
1335 (9th Cir. 1984) (same). 
 70. See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: 
A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 441 (2009). For examples of 
factors that courts use to set statutory damage awards, see Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. Luban, 282 
F. Supp. 2d 123, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (listing seven factors for courts to consider).  
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 The Copyright Act also does not define what constitutes “willful” 
infringement,71 and judges tend to interpret the term broadly. Judges 
have held that “willfulness” includes not only situations in which a 
defendant knew its act was infringing but also situations in which it 
“had reason to know” or “recklessly disregarded the fact that its con-
duct constituted copyright infringement.”72 For instance, the influen-
tial Second Circuit has said that willfulness can mean that the de-
fendant “ ‘recklessly disregarded’ the possibility that ‘its conduct 
represented infringement’ ” and that “[a] plaintiff is not required to 
show that the defendant ‘had knowledge that its actions constitute[d]  
an infringement.’ ”73
 The Act is more explicit about the burden of proof for an innocent 
infringer: the defendant must show that it “was not aware and had 
no reason to believe” that its act constituted infringement.74 Com-
mentators and courts agree that this standard has both a subjective 
component (the infringer believed it was not infringing) and an objec-
tive component (it was reasonable for the infringer to believe it was 
not infringing).75 Even if the defendant-infringer can meet this bur-
den, a court still cannot give weight to an innocent infringer defense 
if the defendant had access to copies of the infringed work that bore 
proper copyright notice.76 This is true regardless of the strength of 
the evidence showing that the defendant reasonably and in good faith 
believed its actions were not infringing.77
 Finally, although the Act implies that judges should make all of 
the relevant rulings regarding statutory damage awards (for exam-
ple, whether a defendant acted willfully, the amount of the award, 
etc.),78 the Supreme Court in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, 
 71. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 14.2.1(a) (2008) (noting that the 
Copyright Act “does not define willfulness for purposes of determining the availability of 
increased statutory damages”). 
 72. Id.; see, e.g., Island Software & Computer Serv., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 
257, 264 (2d Cir. 2005); Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 177, 190 (D.  
Mass. 2007). 
 73. Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 
 74. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006). 
 75. See Childress v. Taylor, 798 F. Supp. 981, 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Allen-Myland, Inc. 
v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 1014, 1027 (E.D. Pa. 1991). See generally NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 20, § 14.04[B][2][a], at 14-74 (stating that a defendant satisfies the 
innocent infringer defense only if he can prove that “his infringing conduct was made in a 
good faith belief of [his] innocence” and that “he was reasonable in holding that good  
faith belief”).  
 76. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(d), 402(d) (2006). 
 77. See BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2005); UMG Recordings, 
Inc. v. Cuccia, No. 06-C-638-C, 2007 WL 5490756, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 6, 2007); Original 
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. J.F. Reichert, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 458, 464-65 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
 78. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)-(2) (2006) (stating that a statutory damages award should be 
in an amount “as the court considers just” and that “[a] court in its discretion” may in-
crease the award if “the court finds” the defendant acted willfully). 
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Inc.79 concluded that the Seventh Amendment “provides a right to a 
jury trial on all issues pertinent to an award of statutory damages.”80
III.  THE PROBLEM: HOW THE STATUTORY DAMAGES REGIME CHILLS 
THE CREATION OF NEW WORKS
 There are two fundamental flaws in copyright’s statutory damages 
regime: one that gives decisionmakers too much discretion and one 
that gives them too little. It is best to consider each separately. 
A. The Problem of Too Much Discretion: The Unpredictability of  
Statutory Damage Awards
 The problem of too much discretion arises from the fact that 
judges or juries may select from a broad range of statutory damages 
awards: from $750 to $30,000 for ordinary infringements and upward 
to $150,000 for “willful” infringements.81 Depending upon the facts of 
any particular case, an award selected within this range could merely 
approximate a plaintiff’s actual damages. But it could just as easily 
be partially or even severely punitive (for example, a $150,000 award 
for downloading a single song). 
 The specter of punitive statutory damages would be less proble-
matic if the sole concern of the law was to discourage all unautho-
rized uses of copyrighted works. But some uses are socially desirable 
and cause little harm to copyright owners. Of course, some of these 
uses might be a fair use or the use of only a copyright owner’s “ideas,” 
but it can be difficult to know this ex ante.82 Thus, prospective users 
must consider the possibility of potential liability when they use a 
work without permission. It is here that the broad discretion built 
into the statutory damages regime becomes problematic. 
 Imagine, for instance, you are a documentary filmmaker with a 
small budget but a big idea. You want to do a movie about how the oil 
and gas industries have manipulated the media to create uncertainty 
about the scientific case for global warming. Much of the movie will 
consist of footage you yourself shoot. But you also plan to use numer-
ous clips from television to make your point, such as clips of oil com-
pany executives testifying before Congress, energy company adver-
tisements, and footage of industry-supported scientists debunking 
global warming. 
 Of course, it is possible that use of these clips will be considered a 
fair use. A court might find that your work is a form of commentary, 
criticism, or scholarship. But it is often difficult to know in advance 
 79. 523 U.S. 340 (1998). 
 80. Id. at 355. 
 81. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006). 
 82. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text. 
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how a fair use issue will be decided.83 There are so many variables 
(such as the amount of the underlying work used, whether your point 
could have been made without the underlying work, the nature of the 
underlying work, the effect of your use upon the copyright owner’s 
potential markets) that making such a prediction is  
inherently risky.84
 You could approach the copyright owner of each clip and request 
permission to use it (either for free or for a limited fee), but the more 
works you use, the more time-consuming and costly this process be-
comes. Moreover, the copyright owners might insist on an exorbitant-
ly high fee or refuse your request altogether.85
 Another possibility is that you could forge ahead and use the clips 
without permission. Before you do this, however, you would want to 
have some sense of your potential liability if your actions are not a 
fair use. Moreover, you might find it impossible to have your work 
distributed unless you can obtain insurance coverage in the event an 
infringement has occurred.86 But for an insurance company to cover 
this risk, it too must be able to assess your potential liability. 
 This is where the unpredictable nature of statutory damage 
awards creates a problem. Of course, it is possible that if you were 
found liable a statutory damages award would be limited to the share 
of your profits attributable to the infringement. In that instance, you 
might choose to forge ahead, knowing that even if your use were 
found unfair, your liability would not be unreasonably high. 
 But because the Copyright Act provides for statutory damage 
awards within a fairly large range—from $750 to $30,00087—you 
could potentially face liability of up to $30,000 for each work in-
fringed. And if your infringement is found to be “willful”—which a 
fact finder could find merely by determining that you should have 
known your action was infringing or that you recklessly disregarded 
 83. Lemley, Licensing, supra note 22, at 185-86 (noting that it is difficult to know ex 
ante whether a use will be a fair use and that “[i]ndividuals, non-profits, and small compa-
nies may not be able to afford [a] lawyer” to litigate a fair use defense). 
 84. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994) (noting that 
there are no “bright-line rules” for a fair use analysis, that the doctrine calls for a “case-by-
case analysis,” and that all of the statutory factors must be “explored, and the results 
weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright”). 
 85. Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 22, at 1501 (relaying the story of how the 
Rolling Stones’ agent wanted $10,000 for the right to use the line “What’s confusing you is 
the nature of my game” to begin a chapter in a book on game theory). 
 86. HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 32, at 5 (quoting a leading “errors and omissions” 
insurance broker on how “you cannot put anything on the air without E&O insurance” and 
describing how E&O policies require “permission for every snippet of film” used in a work 
and make no exceptions for fair use).
 87. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006). 
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the copyright owners’ rights88—the damages could be as high as 
$150,000 for each infringed work.89
 Now do the math. Let us assume that in making your film you will 
use thirty clips from other sources. You know these clips are pro-
tected by copyright and that your use would be infringing if it is not 
found to be a fair use (which you know is uncertain). Moreover, while 
a court could find that your use was not willful because you had a 
reasonable fair use argument, it need not necessarily reach that con-
clusion. Thus, all you know ex ante is that you could conceivably be 
hit with statutory damages of as much as $150,000 for each of the 
thirty works ($4.5 million) if your use was found to be willful, or 
$30,000 for each work ($900,000) if your use was not found to be will-
ful. Surely this would be enough to make any low budget filmmaker 
think twice before using another’s work, especially when using mul-
tiple works.90
 Consider, for instance, the difficulties that the producers of the 
prize-winning documentary Eyes on the Prize faced when they 
wanted to distribute the film after the original licenses for the under-
lying works had lapsed. The filmmakers were faced with what the 
Center for Social Media at American University calls “a creative 
stranglehold”:  
There is no central place to find out who owns what. There is no 
rule of thumb for pricing. No one has to agree to license. And it 
doesn’t matter if you didn’t intend to quote it. Did somebody sing 
“Happy Birthday” in your documentary? Too bad—you owe Time 
Warner a small fortune.91
The producers of Eyes on the Prize did succeed in obtaining the per-
missions needed to redistribute the film, but this was only after the 
producers received a $600,000 grant from the Ford Foundation and a 
$250,000 grant from a New York philanthropist.92 These grants 
would undoubtedly not have materialized had Eyes on the Prize not 
had such a high profile as the seminal documentary on the civil 
 88. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
 89. § 504(c)(2).
 90. See also Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 22, at 1498 (noting that even when 
authors want to assert a fair use claim, publishers and distributors might be unwilling to 
accept the risk). 
 91. DeNeen L. Brown & Hamil R. Harris, A Struggle for Rights, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 
2005, at C01; see also Nancy Ramsey, The Hidden Costs of Documentaries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
16, 2005, at 2.13 (stating that the producers of the 1994 documentary Hoop Dreams had to 
pay $5,000 to use the song Happy Birthday).
 92. Ramsey, supra note 91. 
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rights era. In the interim, the documentary was not broadcast on tel-
evision and was not available on video or DVD for over ten years.93
 Of course, if prospective users could have confidence that those 
awarding statutory damages would use their discretion wisely and 
limit awards to reasonable amounts whenever a defendant had at 
least a colorable fair use argument, then users might have the confi-
dence to forge ahead with their projects without permission. But the 
Copyright Act provides no guidance as to how this discretion should 
be exercised, and case precedent provides little help. Not surprising-
ly, Pamela Samuelson and Tara Wheatland concluded in a recent 
survey of statutory damages awards that the awards are “frequently 
arbitrary, inconsistent, . . . and sometimes grossly excessive.”94
 Consider the award granted in Los Angeles Times, Inc. v. Free Re-
public.95 Free Republic operated a website on which users were  
allowed to post comments on both current events and the media cov-
erage of those events.96 Users of the website routinely posted articles, 
including articles from the plaintiffs’ papers, the Los Angeles Times
and Washington Post.97 The plaintiffs contended that the defendants 
were facilitating copyright infringement of their works and that this 
“free” posting deprived them of archive fees that users would pay if 
they had to access the articles at the plaintiffs’ websites.98
 Commentators have suggested that Free Republic had at least a 
“plausible” argument that the posting of articles on its website was a 
fair use.99 However, the court not only rejected the fair use argument 
but also slammed Free Republic with an exorbitant $1 million statu-
tory damage award.100 As Samuelson and Wheatland point out, the 
fact that this “lawsuit was later settled for $10,000 shows how out of 
proportion the statutory damage award was.”101
 93. Id.; see also Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 22, at 1500 (noting how Alex 
Gibney’s documentary, Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room, was released without valu-
able film clips because the filmmakers were unable to secure permission to use the works). 
 94. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 70, at 441. 
 95. No. 98-7840 MMM AJWX, 2000 WL 1863566 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2000). 
 96. L.A. Times, Inc. v. Free Republic, No. CV 98-7840 MMM (AJWx), 2000 WL 
565200, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2000). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 70, at 462-63 (contending that Free Re-
public raised a “plausible fair use defense”); see also Alan E. Garfield, The First Amend-
ment as a Check on Copyright Rights, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 587, 600-03 (2001) 
(suggesting that Free Republic’s action might be an instance in which “First Amendment 
concerns should trump the assertion of copyright rights”).
 100. L.A. Times, Inc., 2000 WL 1863566, at *1, 3.  
 101. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 70, at 462. Samuelson and Wheatland also 
point to Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455 (D. Md. 2004), as an 
example of a case where a defendant had a “not implausible” fair use defense but was nev-
ertheless hit with a $19.7 million jury award even though the actual damages were  
approximately $60,000. Id. at 463.  
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B.  The Problem of Too Little Discretion: The Frightening  
Predictability of Minimal Statutory Damage Awards When Numerous 
Works are Infringed
 The second flaw of the statutory damages regime—that it gives 
decisionmakers too little discretion—derives from the regime’s me-
chanical rule for awarding minimal statutory damages. As previously 
discussed, judges and juries are required to grant at least a minimal 
statutory damage award of $750 for every work infringed.102 While 
this sounds like petty change compared to a lawyer’s hourly fee, it 
can produce extravagantly large damage awards when multiple 
works are infringed. 
 This prospect of harshly punitive damages could scare off any art-
ist who wants to use multiple works without permission unless the 
artist has an ironclad fair use or idea/expression defense. But, again, 
the murkiness of these doctrines means that these defenses are rare-
ly ironclad. Consequently, a prospective user would often be best ad-
vised to avoid the use altogether. 
 Consider, for instance, a little known artist who plans to make a 
collage using a thousand tiny thumbnail reproductions of famous 
photographs. The artist’s use of these photos may very well be consi-
dered a fair use. But if it is not, the artist could be hit with a mini-
mum statutory damage award for each work used. 
 The mandatory minimal damage award regime can also produce 
perverse incentives for creators of new technologies who may fear 
being subject to secondary liability for infringements by third parties 
who use their technologies.103 For example, if Google, the owner of 
YouTube, could be subject to a minimum statutory damage award for 
every copyrighted work infringed by one of YouTube’s users, its po-
tential liability would be astronomical.104 As Stephanie Berg has 
pointed out, the prospect of such vast awards threatens to discourage 
the creation of new and socially valuable technologies 105 even though 
these technologies are the mainstay of our national economy and of-
 102. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006). 
 103. See Berg, supra note 42, at 267 (arguing that creators of new technologies are de-
terred from innovating because of the threat of statutory damages for secondary liability).  
 104. Id. at 320. Viacom has sued Google and YouTube for direct and secondary liability 
for the downloading of Viacom works on YouTube by users. Id. Viacom is seeking maxi-
mum statutory damages for each infringement. Id. See Complaint for Declaratory and  
Injunctive Relief and Damages at 18-26, Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
13, 2007), available at http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/vvg.pdf. The district court judge 
recently granted YouTube’s motion for summary judgment based upon the safe harbor 
provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., Nos. 
07 Civ. 2103(LLS), 07 Civ. 3582(LLS), 2010 WL 2532404 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2010). Viacom 
has said it would appeal the decision. Judge Sides with YouTube in Viacom Infringement 
Case, 17 No. 6 WESTLAW J. INTELL. PROP. 3 (Jul. 13, 2010).  
 105. See Berg, supra note 42, at 271-72. 
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ten benefit copyright owners in the long run by creating new vehicles 
for exploiting their works. 
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.106 illustrates how punitive 
statutory damage awards can chill innovation. MP3.com had the idea 
to create a service that would allow the owners of music to access 
their music from any computer.107 Before users could access a CD, 
they would first have to prove to MP3.com that they had purchased 
it.108 Once they had met this burden, MP3.com would be willing to 
stream the music to them at any computer they were using.109 To fa-
cilitate this streaming of music, MP3.com purchased thousands of 
CDs and copied the music onto its servers.110
 Once again, commentators argued that MP3.com had at least a 
plausible fair use argument.111 After all, MP3.com streamed only mu-
sic that users had originally purchased, so the copyright owners 
would already have received some compensation.112 MP3.com simply 
made it easy for users to enjoy their music in different locations. 
 Nevertheless, the court not only rejected any fair use defense but 
also found that MP3.com had “willfully” infringed the plaintiffs’ copy-
rights.113 The court awarded statutory damages in the amount of 
$25,000 for each CD that was infringed, for a staggering total of $118 
million,114 even though there was no evidence that the plaintiffs had 
been harmed by the defendant’s actions115—indeed, MP3.com’s ser-
vice had not even been fully put into operation.116
IV.  THE CHOICE: THE POTENTIAL REMEDIAL PURPOSES OF STATUTORY 
DAMAGES
 Copyright’s statutory damage remedy could potentially serve a 
variety of purposes. Statutory damage awards could, for instance, be 
primarily compensatory. The goal would be to compensate plaintiffs 
for the approximate harm that resulted from a defendant’s use of 
 106. No.00 CIV. 472(JSR), 2000 WL 1262568 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000). 
 107. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. David Nimmer has speculated that it could require anywhere from 60,000 to 
600,000 permissions for a company such as MP3.com to lawfully use 10,000 recorded songs 
for its service. Nimmer, supra note 17, at 265-66.  
 111. See, e.g., Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 70, at 462 n.97 (noting MP3.com’s 
claim that it was merely “facilitating lawful personal uses of music akin to the facilitation 
of personal uses held lawful in the Sony Betamax case”).  
 112. UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 352. 
 113. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., No.00 CIV. 472 (JSR), 2000 WL 1262568, 
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000). 
 114. Id. at *6. 
 115. Id. at *5 (noting that the plaintiffs made no attempt to prove any actual damages 
suffered as a result of the defendant’s alleged infringement). 
 116. Prior to the lawsuit, MP3.com had not charged a fee to its subscribers. UMG Re-
cordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 351. 
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their work.117 Under this scenario, courts awarding statutory damag-
es would try to mimic what a plaintiff would receive had she directly 
sought actual damages under the Copyright Act.118 The primary ben-
efit of allowing for statutory damages is that it would allow a plaintiff 
to be compensated even when actual damages may be difficult to 
prove.119 Admittedly, courts would have to engage in some guesswork 
in these instances. But the point is that this guesswork would be 
aimed, however imprecisely, at compensating a plaintiff for the harm 
caused by a defendant’s actions. 
 Alternatively, statutory damages could have a restitutionary pur-
pose. Here, courts would try to award statutory damages that  
approximate the amount of ill-gotten profit a defendant received from 
infringing the plaintiff’s property.120 The goal of the statutory damage 
award would be to shift this “unjust enrichment” from the defendant 
to the plaintiff.121 Once again, courts in this instance would be using 
statutory damages to mimic an award that copyright plaintiffs could 
seek directly under the Act.122
 Just as plaintiffs can pursue both actual damages and a defen-
dant’s nonduplicative profits, a judge might similarly award statuto-
ry damages that approximate these combined amounts. Here again, 
the judge would be granting an award that is commensurate with 
what plaintiffs could obtain directly under the Act.123
 The notion that statutory damages should be an approximate 
substitute for actual damages and profits has considerable support in 
the case law. Under the previous Copyright Act of 1909, some courts 
even barred plaintiffs from seeking statutory damages if adequate 
proof of actual damages and the defendant’s profits existed.124 Even 
 117. See JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 25 (2d ed. 2006) (describing 
compensatory damages as “compensation in money for loss or detriment caused by the 
wrongful act of another” and that the basic rule “is to place the plaintiff in the position she 
would have occupied had the wrong not occurred”). 
 118. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 161 (1976) (noting that “[d]amages are awarded to 
compensate the copyright owner for losses from the infringement”). 
 119. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 71, § 14.2, at 14:41 (stating that a “rationale commonly 
given for statutory damages is that” actual damages are often difficult to prove so statutory 
damages are necessary to give plaintiffs an incentive to enforce their rights and to deter 
potential infringers). 
 120. See FISCHER, supra note 117, at 330 (noting that “[r]estitution is based on the goal 
of avoiding unjust enrichment”). 
 121. See id. 
 122. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2006); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 161 (noting that a 
plaintiff’s right to recover an infringer’s profits is intended “to prevent the infringer from 
unfairly benefitting from a wrongful act”). 
 123. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006) (allowing plaintiffs to recover both actual damages 
and non-duplicative profits). 
 124. See, e.g., Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 378 (9th Cir. 
1947). See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 71, §14.2, at 14:41 to :42 (noting that courts 
construing the Copyright Act of 1909 drew varied implications from the existence of evi-
dence of actual damages and profits but that some held that statutory damages “were not 
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under the current Copyright Act of 1976, which permits plaintiffs to 
opt for statutory damages regardless of whether evidence of actual 
damages and profits exists,125 courts still “often try to approximate 
actual damages and profits” when determining what amount to 
award.126
 The third potential purpose of statutory damages is punitive. 
Here, the goal would be to punish a defendant for wrongful behavior 
and deter other potential infringers.127 In this instance, statutory 
damages would provide a remedy that is not available to plaintiffs 
who seek actual damages and profits. Punitive damages are not men-
tioned in the Copyright Act, and courts have inferred from this si-
lence that plaintiffs who seek actual damages and profits are barred 
from receiving punitive damages.128
 By contrast, courts readily assume that statutory damages may be 
punitive.129 Judges see evidence of a congressional intent to authorize 
punitive awards in the provision allowing for enhanced statutory 
damages for “willful” infringements.130 The legislative history of the 
Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act 
of 1999 (“The Digital Theft Act”),131 which increased statutory dam-
age awards to their current limits, also contains explicit Congres-
sional support for punitive statutory damages: 
Courts and juries must be able to render awards that deter others 
from infringing intellectual property rights. It is important that 
the cost of infringement substantially exceed the costs of compli-
available if damages and profits had been proved”); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 20, § 
14.04[F][1][d], at 14-120 (stating that neither party could request statutory damages if 
there was adequate proof of actual damages and a defendant’s profits). 
 125. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 20, § 14.04[A], at 14-66 (noting that the 1976 Act 
allows copyright owners to opt for statutory damages without regard to whether evidence 
of actual damages or profits was submitted and even if a copyright owner “intentionally 
declined to offer such evidence”). 
 126. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 71, § 14.2.1, at 14:43. Even in the Capitol Records Inc. v. 
Thomas-Rasset file-sharing case the district court acknowledged that while statutory dam-
ages were appropriate, statutory damages “must still bear some relation to actual damag-
es.” 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1053-54 (D. Minn. 2010).  
 127. FISCHER, supra note 117, at 919-20 (noting that the purpose of punitive damages 
is to “punish” and to “deter wrongful conduct by the defendant or others”). 
 128. See, e.g., Oboler v. Goldin, 714 F. 2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1983). See generally Marc J. 
Rachman, Sara L. Edelman, & David S. Greenberg, Are Punitive Damages Available Under 
the Copyright Act, FINDLAW, 2005, http://library.findlaw.com/2005/Feb/10/172826.html 
(restating the general rule that punitive damages are not available for copyright plaintiffs 
who seek actual damages and profits and criticizing a few lower courts decisions that have 
suggested otherwise). 
 129. See, e.g., On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 130. Id. (stating that “[t]he purpose of punitive damages—to punish and prevent mali-
cious conduct—is generally achieved under the Copyright Act through the provisions . . . 
which allow increases to an award of statutory damages in cases of willful infringement”). 
 131. Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. 
L. No. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774. 
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ance, so that persons who use or distribute intellectual property 
have a strong incentive to abide by the copyright laws.132
It is hardly surprising, then, that the Supreme Court in Feltner v. 
Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.133 said that statutory damages 
“may serve purposes traditionally associated with legal relief, such as 
compensation and punishment.”134 Nor is it surprising that lower 
courts have echoed this sentiment.135
 Scholars, too, readily acknowledge that statutory damages may be 
used for punitive purposes. But many fear that courts grant punitive 
awards far more often than Congress intended.136 They point out that 
statutory damages under the 1909 Act were viewed as a substitute 
remedy for plaintiffs who had difficulty proving actual damages.137
The awards were supposed to approximate a plaintiff’s actual dam-
ages, not to punish a defendant.138 Indeed, the Act expressly provided 
that statutory damages “shall not be regarded as a penalty.”139
 The current 1976 Act does not include this limiting language, but 
many scholars view this change as insignificant. They believe Con-
 132. H.R. REP. NO. 106-216, at 6 (1999) (emphasis added). 
 133. 523 U.S. 340 (1998). 
 134. Id. at 352 (emphasis added). 
 135. See, e.g, On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that the 
enhanced damages for willful infringements are intended to have a punitive purpose); Cass 
County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 643 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that statutory 
damages are “not only ‘restitution of profit and reparation for injury,’ but also are in the 
nature of a penalty, ‘designed to discourage wrongful conduct’ ” (quoting F.W. Woolworth 
Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952))); Nat’l Football League v Prime-
Time 24 Joint Ventures, 131 F. Supp. 2d 458, 478 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that statu-
tory damages can have a punitive purpose). 
 136. See, e.g., Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 70, at 451-56; see also generally J. 
Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing: 
The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright In-
fringement, 83 TEX. L. REV. 525 (2004); Berg, supra note 42. 
 137. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 70, at 448. 
 138. See Berg, supra note 42, at 279 (reviewing the legislative history of the 1909 Act 
and concluding that “statutory damages were meant to be compensatory to ensure that 
copyright owners would receive some award in the absence of proof of actual damages but 
not punitive in nature”). 
 139. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1976) (superseded). Despite this language in the Act, the Su-
preme Court in F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc. indicated that statutory 
damage awards under the 1909 Act could serve a punitive purpose:  
The statutory rule, formulated after long experience, not merely compels resti-
tution of profit and reparation for injury but also is designed to discourage 
wrongful conduct. The discretion of the court is wide enough to permit a resort 
to statutory damages for such purposes. Even for uninjurious and unprofitable 
invasions of copyright the court, may, if it deems it just, impose a liability with-
in statutory limits to sanction and vindicate the statutory policy. 
344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952) (emphasis added). Lower courts have used the Supreme Court’s 
language in F.W. Woolworth to justify their conclusion that statutory damages awarded 
under the 1976 Copyright Act may have a punitive purpose. See, e.g., Cass County Music 
Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 643 (8th Cir. 1996).  
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gress fully intended for the statutory damage remedy to serve the 
same compensatory purpose that it did under the 1909 Act.140 The 
only exception is for willful infringements, which scholars acknowl-
edge warrant punitive damages. But scholars contend that Congress 
intended for the “willful infringement” exception to be used spar-
ingly, in what the legislative history referred to as “exceptional  
cases.”141
 If scholars are correct—that Congress intended punitive statutory 
damages to be awarded rarely—they are right to complain about 
their overuse.142 Part of the problem is that courts have expansively 
interpreted the term “willful.”143 Thus, an infringement is “willful” 
not just when a defendant knows he is infringing, but also when a 
defendant “had reason to know” his actions were infringing or “reck-
lessly disregarded” the fact that his conduct constituted infringe-
ment.144 These broad interpretations have made enhanced statutory 
damages available much more often than the few “exceptional cases” 
Congress envisioned. 
 Even when an infringement is not “willful,” a statutory damage 
award can still be punitive. This is because the statute provides no 
guidance on how courts are supposed to exercise their discretion 
within the ordinary range of $750 to $30,000, and courts have yet to 
develop workable standards to control this discretion.145 Thus, as 
Pamela Samuelson and Tara Wheatland have convincingly shown, 
 140. Berg, supra note 42, at 295 (reviewing the legislative history of the 1976 Act and 
finding that the “most often proffered justification” for keeping statutory damages was that 
they “were necessary to protect the copyright owner who may have suffered damages but 
was unable to prove them”).  
 141. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 70, at 458 (citing S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 144-
45 (1975)). 
 142. See, e.g., Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 585, 586 
n.10 (6th Cir. 2007) (statutory damages of $806,000 even though actual damages were 
approximately $18,458); Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 
74 F.3d 488, 496 (4th Cir. 1996) (statutory damages of $400,000 even though defendant 
only profited from the copyright infringement by roughly $10,200); Macklin v. Mueck, 373 
F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1335-36 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (statutory damages of $300,000 for copyright 
infringement litigation involving two poems); L.A. Times, Inc. v. Free Republic, No. 98-
7840 MMM AJWX, 2000 WL 1863566, at *1-3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2000) ($1 million statuto-
ry damages award for posting newspaper articles on website for users to comment on).  
 143. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 70, at 459. See generally Jeffrey M. Tho-
mas, Note, Willful Copyright Infringement: In Search of a Standard, 65 WASH. L. REV. 903 
(1990) (discussing lack of a clear “willfulness” standard in the jurisprudence and proposing 
a resolution). 
 144. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 71, § 14.2.1, at 14:48; see also Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, 
Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that “willfulness” includes conduct where a 
defendant “ ‘recklessly disregarded’ the possibility that ‘its conduct represented infringe-
ment’ ” (quoting Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1999))). 
 145. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 70, at 459.
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“[e]xactly where in this very broad range any particular statutory 
award will be rendered is anybody’s guess.”146
 Finally, as noted in Part III, there are situations in which courts 
are forced to give punitive statutory damage awards.147 This is most 
likely to occur when a defendant has infringed on multiple works but 
has caused little actual harm to the copyright owner. Notwithstand-
ing the copyright owner’s slight damages, the Copyright Act instructs 
courts to award at least a minimum statutory damage award for each 
work infringed.148
 The “one award per work” rule can have enormously punitive con-
sequences when a defendant has engaged in minor infringements of a 
large number of works. A contemporary example is a defendant who 
illegally downloaded 1000 songs. While the actual injury to the plain-
tiffs might be $1 per song, or $1000, the defendant could be hit with a 
minimum statutory damage award of $750 per work, for a grand to-
tal of $750,000! Courts have famously granted such exorbitant 
awards in some recent cases,149 even though some judges have openly 
complained about the size of the awards.150 These awards have 
prompted some commentators to suggest that these outsized damag-
es may be unconstitutional under recent Supreme Court jurispru-
dence finding unduly harsh punitive damage awards to be a violation 
of a defendant’s due process rights.151
 Certainly, having a minimum statutory damage award can be an 
important incentive for plaintiffs to enforce their rights when damag-
es from an infringement are hard to prove or only negligible.152 But 
requiring a minimum statutory damage award for each infringed 
work can occasionally transform this reasonable incentive into an 
extravagant windfall, such as when numerous works have been in-
fringed and the actual damages are minimal.153
 146. Id. 
 147. See supra Part III.B. 
 148. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 162 (1976) (stating that when a “suit involves infringe-
ment of more than one separate and independent work, minimum statutory damages for 
each work must be awarded”). 
149. See, e.g., Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 458 (D. 
Md. 2004) (statutory damage award of $19 million).  
 150. See, e.g, Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting 
that the aggregation of statutory damage awards in a class action suit “potentially distorts 
the purpose of both statutory damages and class actions” and that in a sufficiently serious 
case might violate a defendant’s due process rights). 
 151. Barker, supra note 136, at 536-59 (suggesting that constitutional limits on puni-
tive damages should apply to copyright statutory damage awards). 
 152. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 71, § 14.2, at 14:41 (noting that one rationale for statutory 
damages was to provide an incentive for copyright owners to enforce their rights when 
actual damages are difficult to prove). 
 153. Barker, supra note 136, at 525-26. 
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V.  THE THEORY: PRINCIPLES FOR DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE 
AMOUNT OF STATUTORY DAMAGES
 The discretion built into the statutory damages scheme might 
seem to be one of its strengths. It gives judges and juries flexibility to 
respond to the facts of each case and to award the type of damages—
compensatory, restitutionary, or punitive—they think appropriate. 
 But this same flexibility also makes it difficult for users to predict 
the scope of their potential liability. As noted in Part III, this uncer-
tainty can significantly affect prospective users’ willingness to create 
new works embodying parts of other copyrighted works.154 Prospec-
tive users might be willing to forge ahead if they know their liability 
will be limited to a share of their profits or the copyright owner’s ac-
tual damages, but they will likely forgo many projects if they fear the 
possibility of being forced to pay punitive damages. 
 Conversely, prospective users of multiple works can find them-
selves deterred by the lack of discretion built into the minimum sta-
tutory damages requirement. These minimal damages, while paltry 
in isolation, can become hugely punitive when a user incorporates 
numerous works into his or her project.155
 Whether the Damocles sword of potential punitive damages is 
problematic in both these instances depends upon the type of en-
titlement society wants to create with copyright law. If the goal of 
copyright law is ensure that people do not use a copyright owner’s 
property without permission, then the threat of punitive damages is 
desirable. Punitive damages send an unmistakable message: “Do not 
trespass on this property without permission.” The larger societal 
question is whether we want copyright to create such a formidable 
property entitlement. Do we want copyright law to have such onerous 
penalties that it will discourage any uses of copyrighted works other 
than those voluntarily granted by the owner? 
 Insight into that question can be gained from Guido Calabresi and 
A. Douglas Melamed’s seminal article, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral.156 In this ar-
ticle, Calabresi and Melamed articulate principles for determining 
what type of protection to give to different types of entitlements. 
They suggest that some types of entitlements should be protected by 
powerful “property rules” that protect an owner’s right to exclude 
people from using the entitlement without the owner’s permission.157
As Calabresi and Melamed explain, “an entitlement is protected by a  
 154. See supra Part III.A. 
 155. See supra Part III.B. 
 156. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 48. 
 157. Id. at 1092. 
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property rule to the extent that someone who wishes to remove the 
entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary 
transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by 
the seller.”158
 By contrast, some entitlements are protected by a weaker “liabili-
ty rule.” Under a liability rule, others may take or use another’s en-
titlement as long as they are willing to pay an “objectively deter-
mined” fair price.159 In Calabresi and Melamed’s words, “[w]henever 
someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an 
objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a 
liability rule.”160
 Calabresi and Melamed suggest that liability rules are particular-
ly appropriate when the transaction costs of negotiating voluntary 
licenses are prohibitive.161 For instance, it is impracticable to nego-
tiate for the right to negligently injure someone in the future.162 In-
deed, if people’s rights to be free from accidental injury were pro-
tected by a property rule, it would “require all who engage in activi-
ties that may injure individuals to negotiate with them before an ac-
cident,” a practice that Calabresi and Melamed concede “would be 
extremely expensive.”163 Thus, rather than protect people’s right to be 
free from accidental injury by a property rule, the law instead pro-
tects the victims by a liability rule—a rule that allows for noncon-
sensual injuries but requires negligent tortfeasors to pay compensa-
tion determined by a neutral fact finder.164
 While high transaction costs are a common reason for choosing 
between property and liability rules, Calabresi and Melamad identify 
other factors that can affect this decision, including preferences re-
garding wealth distribution and more general concerns about promot-
ing justice.165 Calabresi and Melamed also acknowledge that most 
entitlements are protected by a mixed set of rules depending upon 
the specific circumstances. For instance, the owner of a house may be 
protected by a property rule when the issue is whether to sell the 
house.166 Thus, the right to sell and at what price is wholly within the 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. at 1108-09; see also Lemley & Weiser, supra note 49, at 786 (noting that 
the conventional wisdom which emerged from Calabresi and Melamed’s article is that 
“courts should rely on liability rules when transaction costs are sufficiently high that the 
relevant parties will not be able to reach a consensual arrangement for access to the re-
source in question”). 
 162. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 48, at 1108-09. 
 163. Id. (emphasis added). 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id. at 1098-1105. 
 166. Id. at 1093. 
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discretion of the owner.167 But that same property might be subject to 
a liability rule for purposes of eminent domain when the government 
can take the property as long as it pays just compensation for it.168
 Building upon Calabresi and Melamed’s initial insights, Richard 
Epstein argues that property rules should be the preferred form of 
protection, with liability rules reserved for situations in which volun-
tarily negotiated transfers are unworkable.169 Epstein prefers proper-
ty rules because he believes privately negotiated transfers are more 
likely to produce fair prices and reflect efficient allocations.170 By con-
trast, Epstein believes that liability rules—which allow people to 
take others’ entitlements as long as they pay a reasonable value—are 
likely to undercompensate the entitlement owners.171 Epstein argues 
that this risk of undercompensation is “pervasive given the inability 
to determine with accuracy the losses, both economic and subjective,” 
when one person takes another’s property without consent.172
 Given this background, it is worth considering what rules should 
protect copyright entitlements. If society believes copyrights should 
be protected by a property rule, a remedial regime that threatens 
nonconsensual users with punitive damages is desirable. The threat 
of punitive damages would reinforce the property rule by sending a 
strong signal to potential users not to trespass without permission. 
 Many commentators do in fact contend that copyrights should be 
protected by property rules.173 They reason that copyrights are a form 
of property—specifically, “intellectual property”—and should there-
fore enjoy the same strong protection typically given to other proper-
ty entitlements.174 Since the essence of a property right is the “right 
to exclude,” these scholars believe copyright owners should similarly 
have a right to prevent others from using their property without con-
 167. See id. at 1092.  
 168. See id. at 1093. 
 169. See generally Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance 
of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091 (1997). 
 170. See id. at 2092-93. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 2093. 
 173. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual 
Property Protection of Software, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 321 (1995); Frank Easterbrook, Intellec-
tual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108 (1990); Trotter Hardy, Prop-
erty (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217 (1996). See generally Lemley 
& Weiser, supra note 49, at 783-84 (noting how “courts and commentators” during the last 
few decades “have sought to align the rights of IP holders with those of real property own-
ers arguing for pervasive use of property rules and limited uses of ‘liability rules’ ”). 
 174. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1033 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, Property] (noting how the term “intellectual proper-
ty” is of recent vintage but that it has influenced courts and commentators to equate copy-
rights and patents with other types of property, particularly real property). 
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sent.175 The classic remedy for enforcing the right to exclude is an in-
junction preventing another from trespassing on one’s property.176
But punitive damages can bolster this right by signaling to potential 
users that the penalty for using another’s copyrighted work without 
permission will be severe. 
 The problem with this argument is that it glosses over the sharp 
distinctions that have always existed between intellectual property 
and other forms of property. Unlike most property rights, copyrights 
and patents have historically been viewed with suspicion—as being 
necessary to encourage authors and inventors to create works, but 
also as an obstacle to the public’s enjoyment of these works.177 In-
deed, the Framers viewed copyrights and patents as privileges be-
grudgingly given to authors and inventors only because they were 
necessary to provide an incentive to create works.178 Accordingly, the 
Framers created a regime for protecting copyrights and patents that 
is decidedly utilitarian.179 They empowered Congress to protect the 
“exclusive [r]ight[s]” of authors and inventors only for the public pur-
pose of promoting “the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts.”180
And these exclusive rights had to be temporary because the Framers 
empowered Congress to grant them for only “limited [t]imes.”181
 Of course, the scope of protection given to copyright owners has 
been vastly expanded from the narrow set of rights originally pro-
 175. Lemley & Weiser, supra note 49, at 783-84 (noting scholars who believe intellec-
tual property should be protected by property rules enforced through injunctive relief). 
 176. Id. at 783 (noting that the classic remedy for trespass is an injunction and that the 
correlation between injunctive relief and “property rules” is so strong that law and econom-
ic scholars refer to injunctive relief as a “property rule” (quoting Calabresi & Melamed, 
supra note 48, at 1106-07)).
 177. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere, Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1966) (noting 
that the “underlying policy” of patent law is to ensure “that ‘the things which are worth to 
the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent,’ as Jefferson put it, must outweigh 
the restrictive effect of the limited patent monopoly”). 
 178. See id. at 5 (noting that the constitutional limitations placed on Congress’ power 
to enact patent and copyright laws were intended to avoid the types of abuses that occurred 
in England through monopolies granted by the Crown to favored parties); see also Lemley, 
Property, supra note 174, at 1031 (describing the “long-standing view” that “free competi-
tion is the norm” and that “[i]ntellectual property rights are an exception to that norm” 
which are “granted only when—and only to the extent that—they are necessary to encour-
age invention”). But see generally Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson 
Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 COR-
NELL L. REV. 953 (2007) (acknowledging the conventional wisdom that the Framers viewed 
copyrights and patents as privileges given only for the utilitarian purpose of encouraging 
the creation of new works but claiming that this historical understanding is more myth 
than reality). 
 179. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (stating that the “economic philoso-
phy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the convic-
tion that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance 
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors”). 
 180. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 181. Id. 
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tected by the first copyright act of 1790.182 The range of subject mat-
ter protected by copyright has been immensely broadened to include 
everything from sound recordings to choreography, pantomimes, vid-
eo games, and architectural design.183 The rights given to copyright 
owners have also been vastly expanded to include rights of perfor-
mance and display and the right to control adaptations of their 
works.184 And the duration of protection, originally set at fourteen 
years with a renewal period of another fourteen years,185 is now set at 
the life of the author plus seventy years,186 a term so expansive as to 
almost mock the Constitution’s “limited [t]imes” restraint. 
 But this expansion of copyright protection has not negated the fact 
that copyright continues to be viewed through the utilitarian lens of 
public benefit.187 Indeed, the rights granted to copyright owners con-
tinue to be riddled with exceptions for the public’s benefit. Thus, cur-
rent copyright law gives the owner of a musical composition the right 
to control public performances of her work,188 but makes exceptions 
for performances in educational settings, horticultural fares, veter-
ans programs, programs for the disabled, and certain nonprofit per-
formances.189 And while copyright owners usually have the right to 
control the reproduction and distribution of their works,190 the Act 
allows users to make sound recordings of musical works as long as 
they pay a fee at a rate set through a neutral administrative pro-
cess.191
 Indeed, even a cursory examination of the Copyright Act reveals 
that copyright entitlements are subject to a varied mixture of protec-
tions. One might argue that property rules set the baseline for copy-
right entitlements: owners are usually free to prevent others from 
using their works without permission. But these property rules are 
by no means universal. Copyright entitlements are also subject to 
compulsory licensing schemes, which, like liability rules, allow users 
to use works without permission as long as they pay an objectively 
 182. See CRAIG JOYCE ET. AL, COPYRIGHT LAW 19-24 (6th ed. 2003) (summarizing his-
torical development of American copyright law). 
 183. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 184. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 185. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003) (describing original and renewal 
terms in 1790 Act). 
 186. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).  
 187. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
 188. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2006) (right of public performance in musical work). 
 189. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2006) (potpourri of exceptions to the public performance right in 
musical works). 
 190. § 106(1)-(3) (right of copyright owner to control reproduction, adaptation and pub-
lic distribution of work). 
 191. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (compulsory license to make and distribute sound record-
ings of musical works). 
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set fee.192 And copyright entitlements are also subject to what Mark 
Lemley and Philip Weiser call “ ‘zero-price’ liability rule[s],” or rules 
that permit others to use copyrighted works without any obligation to 
compensate the owners.193 The “fair use” of a copyrighted work is the 
most important example of a zero-price liability rule.194 But the Copy-
right Act is filled with other specific statutory exemptions for a varie-
ty of narrowly tailored uses.195
 Thus, copyright entitlements have never given copyright owners a 
pure right to exclude. To the contrary, the scope of their entitlements 
has always been determined through a utilitarian balancing that 
weighs the legitimate right of creators to be rewarded for their efforts 
against the valid desire of the public to have access to creative works.196
 Given copyright’s utilitarian purpose and the fact that the law has 
always subjected copyright entitlements to a wide range of property, 
liability, and zero liability rules, how should copyright’s statutory 
damages regime be designed to further this diverse set of goals? 
VI.  THE APPLICATION: DESIGNING STATUTORY DAMAGES TO FURTHER 
COPYRIGHT LAW’S UTILITARIAN PURPOSE
 Statutory damages’ precise role in copyright’s curious mixture of 
property, liability, and zero liability rules is not immediately appar-
ent. On the one hand, it could be argued that statutory damages are 
best considered as part of copyright’s property rule regime. After all, 
a copyright owner can seek statutory damages only if a defendant 
infringes the owner’s work. And if an infringement has occurred, it 
implies that the defendant’s use did not fall into one of the Copyright 
Act’s liability rules (that is, the use was not pursuant to one of the 
act’s compulsory licensing schemes) or zero liability rules (that is, the 
use was not a fair use or the taking of only unprotected ideas, and did 
not fall into one of the statutory exemptions). Thus, one might logi-
cally conclude that the Copyright Act’s property rule regime applies. 
Accordingly, the copyright owner should be entitled to any remedies 
that would support the owner’s right to prevent a defendant from us-
ing the owner’s work without permission. 
 Viewed in this light, the fact that statutory damages can some-
times be punitive seems uncontroversial. For while injunctive relief 
 192. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115, 119 (2006) (compulsory licenses for making sound record-
ings and for the secondary transmissions of works by cable and satellite).  
 193. Lemley & Weiser, supra note 49, at 786. 
 194. Id. at 790-92. 
 195. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2006) (listing a mixture of exceptions to a copyright 
owner’s rights). 
 196. See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 22, at 1491 (describing the “delicate 
balance copyright law aims to achieve between promoting the creation of new works and 
securing adequate access to existing ones”). 
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would protect an owner’s right to stop future unauthorized uses of his 
work, punitive damages—by severely punishing unauthorized uses 
that have already occurred—would powerfully reinforce the copy-
right owner’s right to exclude. Indeed, if Congress limited statutory 
damages to cover only a copyright owner’s compensatory or restitu-
tionary interests, the damages available would be little different from 
the type of damages awarded under a liability rule. But if the pur-
pose of statutory damages is to protect the owner’s right to exclude, 
they may need to include what Calabresi and Melamed refer to as 
“an undefinable kicker” to ensure that users do not unilaterally con-
vert the law’s intended property rule into a liability rule.197 By allow-
ing statutory damages to include the prospect of punitive damages, 
Congress could have provided just such a “kicker.”
 While the above argument is superficially appealing, it is based on 
the false assumption that the boundaries between copyright’s proper-
ty, liability, and zero liability regimes are easily distinguishable. The 
truth, however, is just the opposite. Indeed, it is the vagueness of 
these boundaries that so clearly distinguishes copyright entitlements 
from other types of property entitlements.198
 For instance, whether a user infringes on a copyright owner’s 
work often depends upon whether the user took only the copyright 
owner’s ideas and not expression. But the line between copyrightable 
expression and uncopyrightable ideas is notoriously vague. Judge 
Learned Hand, the author of seminal decisions on the idea/expression 
dichotomy, readily admitted that “no principle can be stated as to 
when an imitator has gone beyond copying the ‘idea,’ ” so that any 
decisions in this area are “inevitably . . . ad hoc.”199 As courts and 
commentators rightly note, the line between unprotected ideas and 
protected expression merely reflects a policy judgment as to what 
elements of a work should fall within a copyright owner’s monopo-
ly.200 A decision that something falls on the idea side reflects a judge’s 
conclusion that granting a copyright owner exclusive rights in those 
elements would unduly hamper the creation of other works for the 
public’s benefit.201
 Given how vague the line between idea and expression can be, 
does it make sense to have a remedial regime that abruptly jumps 
 197. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 48, at 1126. 
 198. Lemley & Weiser, supra note 49, at 793-94 (contending that Calabresi and Me-
lamed assumed property rights were well-defined because they focused on real property 
rights, but noting that intellectual property rights are much more ill-defined). 
 199. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). 
 200. See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 
1971) (acknowledging that an idea/expression analysis turns on the policy question of “how 
large an area . . . did Congress intend to allow the copyright owner to exclude others?”).  
 201. Id. (stating that the “guiding principle” in drawing the line between idea and ex-
pression is “preservation of the balance between competition and protection”). 
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from a zero liability rule (for users who take only ideas) to a property 
rule with punitive damages (for those who take expression)? After all, 
if users know they could be subject to punitive damages if they mis-
calculate where the idea/expression line will be drawn, they will most 
likely opt not to create new works. But this chilling affect frustrates 
the purpose of the idea/expression dichotomy, which is to encourage 
users to build upon others’ ideas.202
 Of course, when a court finds that a defendant has taken a plain-
tiff’s expression, it has by definition concluded that the plaintiff is 
entitled to be compensated. But the question is not whether the 
plaintiff should be compensated. Rather, it is whether the plaintiff 
should receive punitive damages on top of compensatory damages. If 
the law limited plaintiffs to recovering only actual damages and a 
defendant’s profits, this would not be an issue. But once the law al-
lows plaintiffs the right to opt for statutory damages, the potential 
for punitive damages always exists. This is true even if a court does 
not find a defendant’s infringement to be willful, because statutory 
damages can still range as high as $30,000 even though the damage 
caused by a defendant’s use may have been minimal.  
 The same problem arises with the boundary line between the fair 
use of a work, which immunizes the user from liability, and the fail-
ure of a fair use defense, which subjects the user to the full range of 
copyright remedies including statutory damages. Once again, the line 
between this zero liability rule regime and the property rule regime 
is anything but clear. There are so many discretionary variables in a 
fair use analysis (for example, how much of an underlying work may 
be used and the likely effect of the use on the copyright owner’s mar-
kets) that potential users often cannot assume with any certainty 
that their use will be protected.203
 Given how uncertain the line is between fair and not fair use, it 
seems doubtful that copyright’s remedial regime should jump from 
one that forbids liability to one that has the potential for punitive 
damages.204 After all, copyright law includes the fair use defense be-
cause its drafters wanted to encourage certain uses that benefit the 
public without greatly harming copyright owners.205 But if prospec-
 202. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991) (stating that 
copyright law “encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed 
by a work”). 
 203. Lemley, Licensing, supra note 22, at 185-86 (noting that it is “often impossible to 
know ex ante whether any particular use will qualify as fair” because fair use has so many 
indeterminate factors). 
 204. Id. at 191-92 (criticizing the “all-or-nothing” nature of the fair use doctrine: that 
owners are either entitled to no remedies, or the full complement of remedies, depending 
upon whether the fair use doctrine applies).  
 205. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003) (noting that the fair use defense 
allows the public to use another’s “expression . . . in certain circumstances” and noting that 
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tive users know that the line between a fair use and an unfair use is 
elusive, and that their failure to properly identify this line could sub-
ject them to punitive damages, they are likely to avoid the risk by 
forgoing the use. 
 The prospect of punitive damages in these “close call” situations 
chills the creation of new works even when users have potentially 
strong claims that they are taking only ideas or that their uses are 
fair. Users might be willing to forge ahead if they knew in advance 
that they would only be liable for a copyright owner’s compensatory 
or restitutionary interests if their defenses failed. But as long as the 
wild card of punitive damages remains in a copyright owner’s deck of 
remedies, the risk of moving forward will often seem too great.  
 This chilling effect of statutory damages makes a mockery of the Su-
preme Court’s lofty paeans about the important role of the 
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense in ensuring a proper 
balance between the rights of copyright owners and the rights of the 
public.206 It also undermines the Court’s logic for immunizing copyright 
law from First Amendment scrutiny because the idea/expression dichot-
omy and fair use doctrine are copyright law’s “built-in” free speech safe-
guards.207 If the reality is that users vastly underutilize these doctrines 
because they fear that any misstep could subject them to punitive dam-
ages, then copyright’s remedial regime needs to be reformed to restore 
these doctrines to their intended vibrancy.208
 The solution to this problem is to better calibrate copyright’s dam-
ages regime so that it does not unduly chill the creation of derivative 
works. While users should certainly realize that they could poten-
tially be responsible for a copyright owner’s actual damages, they 
should not be discouraged by the threat of punitive damages when 
they vigorously assert their rights to use ideas or to use expression in 
ways that they reasonably believe qualify for fair use protection. In-
deed, as the Supreme Court recognized in its decision on attorney fee 
awards under the Copyright Act, the carefully constructed utilitarian 
balance in copyright law is vindicated just as much when defendants 
the defense “affords considerable ‘latitude for scholarship and comment,’ and even for pa-
rody”) (citation omitted).  
 206. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (“From the infancy of 
copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been 
thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts . . . .’ ” (alterations in original)). 
 207. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219. 
 208. See HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 32, at 1-53 (documenting the underutilization of 
fair use by artists, filmmakers, and other authors). 
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successfully assert defenses as when copyright owners successfully 
enforce their rights.209
 Sheltering users from the prospect of punitive damages, moreover, 
should not be limited to situations where defendants have an arguable 
defense under the idea/expression dichotomy or fair use doctrine. For 
even in situations where a defendant’s use is clearly an infringement, 
there still can be important reasons for limiting a copyright owner’s 
monetary relief to compensatory and restitutionary damages. 
 One example is when the transaction costs of negotiating for the 
use of copyrighted works are prohibitively expensive. Indeed, a cen-
tral insight of Calabresi and Melamed was that liability rules are of-
ten appropriate when transaction costs make privately negotiated 
transfers unreasonably expensive.210 In the copyright context, this is 
most likely to occur when an author wants to create a new work us-
ing parts of multiple underlying works. Recall, for instance, the artist 
who wanted to create a collage made up of a thousand tiny reproduc-
tions of other artists’ photographs. Of course, the artist’s use of these 
photographs might be a fair use. But the artist might reasonably ex-
pect that some courts would reject this defense because he is using 
the works in their entirety.211
 What should the artist do in this context? The artist could nego-
tiate for the use of each and every photograph, but the expense of 
doing so might greatly exceed any likely commercial value of his fi-
nished product.212 The artist might be willing to forge ahead without 
permission if he knows that his potential liability is limited to the 
actual damages of each copyright owner because these damages are 
likely to be minimal. But knowing that the copyright owners could 
opt for statutory damages, with their potentially punitive effect, the 
artist is likely to abandon his endeavor. For even if each copyright 
owner received only the statutory minimum of $750, that amount 
could still far exceed the value added to the artist’s final work by any 
given photograph. And, of course, because the artist wants to use 
many different works, he could face the prospect of numerous statu-
tory damage awards.  
 In these types of situations, the goals of copyright law might be 
better served by imposing liability rules on the artist rather than 
 209. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) (stating that “a successful defense 
of a copyright infringement action may further the policies of the Copyright Act every bit as 
much as a successful prosecution of an infringement claim by the holder of a copyright”). 
 210. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text. 
 211. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that 
copying an entire work, while not precluding a finding of fair use, “militates against such  
a finding”). 
 212. Lemley, Licensing, supra note 22, at 193 (discussing instances in which the crea-
tion of a derivative work would “require[] clearances of so many rights” that it would  
be “uneconomic”). 
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property rules. The artist should be allowed to use the underlying 
works, but, if challenged by a copyright owner, should be compelled 
to pay a reasonable fee commensurate with the actual harm to the 
copyright owner.213 This would allow for the creation of new works in 
situations where the harm to the copyright owner is likely to be mi-
nimal but the transaction costs of negotiating for individual  
licenses are prohibitive. 
 Transaction costs can also be prohibitively expensive when au-
thors want to use works whose ownership is difficult to determine.214
This problem with so-called “orphan works” is endemic to copyright 
law because the law protects works upon creation even if a copyright 
owner never registers with the Copyright Office.215 The standard of 
originality required for copyrightable works is also low, so that even 
the most minimally creative works can be copyrightable, from e-mail 
correspondence to cell phone photographs.216 And for works published 
after March 1, 1989, copyright owners need not even include notice 
on their published works, although the lack of notice can bolster a 
user’s innocent infringement defense.217
 The Copyright Office acknowledged in its report on orphan works 
that prospective users often face insurmountable difficulties in trying 
to locate copyright owners.218 To ensure that the creation of new 
works was not unduly hampered by these difficulties, the Copyright 
Office proposed that users who cannot identify copyright owners after 
a “reasonably diligent search” be able to use the works without per-
mission.219 In the event that copyright owners later surfaced and 
tried to stop the use of derivative works, the proposal calls for a lia-
bility rule regime that denies such owners the right to enjoin the use 
of the derivative works in certain circumstances.220 And more impor-
tantly for present purposes, the proposal limits the copyright owner’s 
monetary relief to a “reasonable” licensing fee and bars the owner 
from recovering statutory damages.221
 213. See id. at 186-87 (similarly arguing that it is sometimes appropriate for courts to 
permit a defendant to continue using a plaintiff’s work without permission as long as the 
user pays a reasonable licensing fee).  
 214. See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (2006) [herei-
nafter REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS] (discussing problems associated with identifying and 
locating copyright owners). 
 215. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006) (providing that copyright registration is permissive). 
 216. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (stating 
that the standard of creativity required for copyrightability is “extremely low”). 
 217. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(a)-(d), 402(a)-(d) (2006). 
 218. See generally REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 214, at 15-40. 
 219. Id. at 96. See generally id. at 96-110. 
 220. Id. at 115. 
 221. See id. at 116. 
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 The Copyright Office’s proposal for orphan works has been intro-
duced in several congressional bills but has yet to be enacted.222 Nev-
ertheless, the logic behind the proposal reflects another example of 
when liability rules are more appropriate than property rules  
because of high transaction costs.223
 Thus far we have focused on situations where the specter of puni-
tive statutory damages is undesirable. But it is important to note 
that there are many infringement actions where a property rule re-
gime backed up by punitive damages may be perfectly appropriate. 
Indeed, such a regime is almost always appropriate when defendants 
usurp the very markets that are ordinarily reserved for copyright 
owners. For instance, when a user simply makes and sells pirated 
copies of a copyright owner’s works, it makes perfect sense for the 
law to support the copyright owner’s right to exclude with a property 
rule regime. The owner should be able to enjoin the defendant’s un-
lawful activities, and punitive damages should be available to deter 
such infringement. 
 In these situations, the public interest in deterring the defendant’s 
use is at its peak. The defendant is not creating any new derivative 
work that might benefit the public and is instead usurping the very 
market that society intended the copyright owner to enjoy. Even when 
a defendant creates a derivative work, his use of a copyright owner’s 
underlying work should still be subject to the copyright owner’s right 
to exclude if the derivative work occupies a market that is typically 
reserved for the copyright owner. For instance, if a defendant made a 
movie based on a Harry Potter book without permission, the derivative 
work would obviously be transformational in that it would contain vast 
original contributions by the derivative authors. But it would exploit 
the market for licensing movie rights to the book that is traditionally 
within the copyright owner’s monopoly. Here, too, it would make sense 
to support the copyright owner’s rights with property rules that allow 
for injunctive relief and punitive damages.224
 Put simply, and as Calabresi and Melamed might have predicted, 
copyright entitlements need to be subject to an array of remedial re-
 222. See BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., “ORPHAN WORKS” IN COPYRIGHT LAW
9-18 (2008), http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/crs/RL33392_080516.pdf (surveying 
legislation introduced to address orphan works issue). 
 223. The Copyright Act similarly creates a “liability rule” for derivative works that 
incorporate foreign works that previously had been in the public domain but have since 
had their copyrights rights restored. The Act provides that a party who relied on the under-
lying work’s public domain status may continue to exploit a derivative work if the party 
pays “reasonable compensation” to the owner of the restored work. 17 U.S.C. § 
104A(d)(3)(A)(ii) (2006). 
 224. Lemley, Licensing, supra note 22, at 195 (contending that there “will be many cir-
cumstances in which even a derivative market should be supported by a property rule” be-
cause “compelling licensing would undermine the incentives associated with exclusivity”). 
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gimes depending upon the nature of a defendant’s use.225 These re-
gimes can be summarized as follows:  
A. Zero Liability Rules 
 At one end of the spectrum are zero liability rules by which a user 
is exempted from any liability. These rules are appropriate for uses 
that have an important societal benefit and cause little harm to the 
copyright owner’s property rights. Uses that are considered a fair use 
are a classic example of this, as would be uses that borrow only a 
copyright owner’s ideas. Statutory exemptions in the Act can also be 
reflective of this balance between public benefit and private harm, al-
though some are merely the product of legislative bargains or favors. 
B. Liability Rules 
 Liability rules fall in the middle of the spectrum. Here, the public 
interest in allowing the use of a copyright owner’s work trumps the 
copyright owner’s right to exclude the use without his permission. 
The law, therefore, should not protect the owner’s copyright with 
strong property rules that would support an owner’s veto power. At 
the same time, the harm to the copyright owner’s property interest is 
sufficiently great that the law should compensate the owner with 
both compensatory and restitutionary damages. The liability rules 
regime is particularly appropriate for uses on the borderline of zero 
liability uses (such as fair use or the taking of ideas) and uses which do 
not impact a copyright owner’s core property rights and which would 
otherwise be unlikely to occur because of high transaction costs. 
C. Property Rules 
Property rules are at the opposite end of the spectrum from zero 
liability rules. They are appropriate when the public benefit of a de-
fendant’s use is at a minimum and the harm to a copyright owner’s 
traditional markets is at its peak. This is especially true for classic 
forms of piracy where a defendant merely reproduces a copyrighted 
work and sells it in the very market that a copyright owner would be 
likely to exploit. It is also true in situations where a defendant 
creates a derivative work in a market that is traditionally reserved 
for the copyright owner. In these instances, copyright owners should 
be entitled to the full range of property rule remedies, including in-
junctive relief and potentially punitive damages. 
 For copyright’s statutory damages to serve these varied remedial 
goals, they need to be calibrated to parallel these different remedial 
regimes. Of course, statutory damages do not come into play in zero 
liability regimes because defendants are exempt from any liability. 
But plaintiffs can seek statutory damages under both of the latter 
two scenarios.  
 225. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text. 
2010]  CALIBRATING COPYRIGHT STATUTORY DAMAGES 37
 The problem is that the Copyright Act creates the potential for 
plaintiffs to recover punitive damages under both of these scenarios, 
when plaintiffs should instead be able to recover punitive damages 
only when the facts match those of the third scenario. A properly ca-
librated statutory damage regime, therefore, would have to distin-
guish between fact patterns that fall under the second scenario, for 
which plaintiffs should be able to recover only compensatory and res-
titutionary damages, and fact patterns falling under the third scena-
rio, for which punitive damages should be available. 
 Having identified how the copyright statutory damages regime 
needs to be reformed to better serve copyright law’s utilitarian pur-
pose, we now turn to three different routes for accomplishing  
this reform.  
VII.  THE SOLUTION: THREE OPTIONS FOR PROPERLY CALIBRATING 
STATUTORY DAMAGES
 There are several ways to reform copyright’s statutory damages 
regime to ensure that plaintiffs recover punitive-like damages only in 
appropriate circumstances. The simplest and least disruptive ap-
proach would be for courts to interpret the existing statutory damage 
provision in a way that distinguished between second and third sce-
nario fact patterns and allowed for punitive-like damages only under 
the latter. An alternative and more direct approach would be for 
Congress to modify the Copyright Act’s statutory damage provision to 
include instructions for courts to distinguish between the two scena-
rios. Finally, a third and more controversial approach would be for 
courts to conclude that the Constitution—either the Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause or the First Amendment Free Speech 
Clause—requires reforms to the statutory damages regime. 
A.  The Interpretative Fix: Construing the Existing Statutory Scheme 
to Restrict the Availability of Punitive Damages
 There is no denying that the current statutory damages scheme 
gives courts broad discretion in granting awards. Section 504(c) of 
the Copyright Act provides that the decision as to the amount of sta-
tutory damages is to be made “as the court considers just.”226 Like-
wise, if a “copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the 
court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in 
its discretion may” choose to increase the award.227 It is true that the 
Supreme Court’s Feltner decision shifted much of this discretion from 
judges to juries.228 But judges will still have influence in the instruc-
 226. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006). 
 227. Id. § 504(c)(2). 
 228. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998). 
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tions they give to jurors and in their power of remittitur to override 
excessive jury awards. And even in Feltner’s aftermath, judges still 
frequently make statutory damage awards because parties often pre-
fer bench trials.229
 Not only do judges have broad discretion, but precedent also sug-
gests that judges often use this discretion wisely to award statutory 
damages in a manner that is largely consistent with the principles 
announced in this Article. Judges often do limit statutory damages to 
amounts that approximate a plaintiff’s actual damages and a defen-
dant’s profits.230 Further, judges frequently limit punitive-like dam-
ages to situations where a defendant’s actions amounted to egregious 
piracy.231 And judges do sometimes grant only small statutory dam-
age awards in situations where defendants had a reasonable belief 
that their actions were a fair use.232
 But there are also many instances where judges do not use their 
discretion wisely. In a recent survey of statutory damage awards, 
Pamela Samuelson and Tara Wheatland found that the awards “are 
frequently arbitrary, inconsistent, unprincipled, and sometimes 
grossly excessive.”233 The authors chronicle instances in which 
harshly punitive damages were awarded even though the defendants 
had plausible fair use claims.234 They also found numerous instances 
in which the statutory damage awards for comparable behavior vary 
widely.235 Finally, the authors observed that the vague definitions of 
“willfulness” existing in the jurisprudence resulted in some courts 
ratcheting up awards based on nothing more than the belief that the 
defendant should have known her actions were infringing.236
 In an effort to correct the problem of arbitrary statutory damage 
awards, Samuelson and Wheatland propose a comprehensive set of 
principles to guide judges in awarding statutory damages.237 The 
principles set forth in that list are largely consistent with the propos-
als in this Article. The authors recommend that statutory damage 
awards should usually “approximate the damages/profits” a plaintiff 
would have received had she not opted for statutory damages (a li-
 229. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 70, at 456 (noting it is “still quite com-
mon” after Feltner for judges to set statutory damage awards). 
 230. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 71, § 14.2.1, at 14:43 (stating that “[c]ourts will often 
try to approximate actual damages and profits when making a statutory damages award”). 
 231. See, e.g., Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills, 519 F. Supp. 730, 733 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (enhanced damages in a case of more egregious infringement). 
 232. See, e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 63 F. Supp. 2d 420, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999) (awarding minimum statutory damages when a defendant had a reasonable belief 
that its use was fair and the harm to the plaintiff was negligible).
 233. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 70, at 441. 
 234. See id. at 480-83. 
 235. See id. at 485-87. 
 236. Id. at 459. 
 237. See id. at 501-09. 
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ability rule) and that enhanced damages for “willful” infringement (a 
property rule) should be reserved for egregious cases such as “a re-
peat infringer or counterfeit operations.”238
 If judges were to follow Samuelson and Wheatland’s recommenda-
tions, it would certainly go a long way toward correcting many of the 
current problems with statutory damage awards. Nevertheless, there 
are two reasons why an interpretive fix by itself is unlikely to miti-
gate statutory damages’ chilling effect. The primary problem is that, 
absent a clear ruling from the Supreme Court, a large mass of lower 
court precedent is unlikely to influence user behavior. Such 
precedent rarely translates into clear signals that potential users and 
their advisors can identify and confidently trust. To the contrary, us-
ers and their advisors are much more likely to take their cues from 
the black-letter rules found in the copyright statute. And those rules 
send the unambiguous message that infringers could potentially be 
liable for up to $30,000 for each infringed work, and up to $150,000 if 
an infringement is found to be “willful.” The Act’s clear signals are 
more likely to influence user behavior than the more subtle signals 
buried in the reasoning of lower court decisions. 
 Second, an interpretative fix cannot solve the problem in those 
instances in which decisionmakers have no choice but to award puni-
tive statutory damages. As noted in Part III, this usually occurs 
when users have infringed multiple works and the decisionmaker is 
required to grant an award for each work infringed.239
 The limitations of an interpretative fix suggest it is unlikely to 
cure the chilling effect caused by statutory damages’ potentially pu-
nitive nature. A better solution would be for Congress to amend the 
Copyright Act to bring it into compliance with the recommendations 
set forth in this Article. 
B.  The Legislative Fix: Amending the Copyright Act’s Statutory 
Damage Provision 
 Crafting a legislative solution is easier said than done. The goal 
would be to fix the current statutory damages regime to correct for 
both those aspects that give decisionmakers too much discretion and 
those that give them too little. To correct the problem of too much 
discretion, the regime would have to instruct decisionmakers to dis-
tinguish between those scenarios in which injunctive relief and puni-
tive damages are appropriate (a property rule) and those in which 
 238. Id. at 502-04 (recommending statutory damages that approximate a plaintiff’s 
damages/profits award for “ordinary direct infringement” when a defendant “did not know 
his conduct was infringing” or “in close fair use cases,” but recommending higher statutory 
damage awards—two or three times actual damages—when defendants “knew they were 
infringing or were reckless about infringement”). 
 239. See supra Part III.B. 
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injunctive relief is inappropriate and only compensatory and restitu-
tionary damages should be awarded (a liability rule). To correct for 
the problem of too little discretion, the minimal statutory damages 
would have to be modified to allow for exceptions in those situations 
where even minimal awards would be unduly punitive. 
 The easiest and least disruptive way to implement the proposed 
solutions would be to modify the Copyright Act’s current remedy pro-
visions. Suggestions for modifying section 502, the current provision 
on injunctive remedies, and section 504, the provision on damages, 
are discussed below. 
1.  Modifying the Section on Injunctive Relief 
 The Copyright Act’s current section on injunctive relief, section 
502, gives judges broad discretion in deciding whether to grant tem-
porary or permanent injunctive relief. It provides that a court may 
grant such relief “as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain 
infringement of a copyright.”240
 The problem with this section is that it gives judges virtually no 
guidance as to how to use their discretion. As noted in Part VI, such 
guidance is critical if judges are to distinguish between scenarios in 
which property rules are appropriate (and injunctive relief should be 
granted) and scenarios in which liability rules are appropriate (and 
injunctive relief should be denied).241 If prospective users with plaus-
ible but not certain fair use or idea/expression defenses are going to 
invest in creating new derivative works, they need to have confidence 
that, if their defenses fail, they will still be able to exploit their deriv-
ative works as long as they pay reasonable compensation to the copy-
right owners of any underlying works.  
 Unfortunately, there is nothing in the current injunction provision 
that instructs courts to deny injunctive relief whenever the societal in-
terests in the continued exploitation of a derivative work outweigh the 
interests of the copyright owner of an underlying work. Of course, grant-
ing an injunction is a discretionary decision, so judges are certainly 
within their rights to deny relief. But longstanding copyright jurispru-
dence instructs courts to grant injunctive relief whenever a copyright 
owner has made a prima facie case of copyright infringement.242
 240. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006). 
 241. See supra notes 196-223 and accompanying text. 
 242. See. e.g., MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 453, 456 (5th 
ed. 2010) (observing that preliminary injunctive relief has been “granted generously in 
copyright cases,” and that “courts have freely granted final injunctions on a finding of copy-
right infringement”).  See generally Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech 
and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 158-65 (1998) (describing 
how “[c]opyright plaintiffs can dispense with most of the normal requirements for obtain-
ing a preliminary injunction, and disputed issues are regularly resolved in their favor”).  
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 To help ensure that judges exercise their discretion to grant in-
junctive relief in a way that more carefully distinguishes between 
property and liability rule scenarios, section 502 should be modified 
as follows. The underlined portions indicate the proposed changes. 
§ 502 Remedies for infringement: Injunctions.
(a) Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this 
title may, subject to the provisions of section 1498 of title 28, grant 
temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem rea-
sonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.  
(b) In determining whether to grant injunctive relief, a court shall 
weigh the likely harm to the copyright owner from the infringer’s 
continued exploitation of the owner’s work against any legitimate 
interests of the infringer or of the public in allowing the exploita-
tion to continue. In weighing these interests, the court should fo-
cus in particular on the following considerations:
(1) The societal interest in giving the copyright owner ex-
clusive control over the use of his or her work: Injunctive 
relief is most appropriate when the infringer is exploiting a mar-
ket or derivative market for the copyright owner’s work that is 
financially significant and customarily exploited by copyright 
owners and which, in the court’s judgment, should not be ex-
ploited except with the express consent of and on terms volunta-
rily agreed to by the copyright owner.
(2) The societal interest in allowing the use to occur with-
out the copyright owner’s permission as long as the copy-
right owner is reasonably compensated: Injunctive relief is 
least appropriate when the infringer is exploiting a market that 
is not financially significant and is not customarily exploited by 
copyright owners and the court can fairly compensate the copy-
right owner through an award of a reasonable license fee and/or 
a share of the infringer’s profits. Factors weighing against in-
junctive relief include but are not limited to the following:
  (A) The use is socially beneficial in that it is transformative; 
 This liberal awarding of injunctive relief was called into question by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), which held that 
final injunctions in patent infringement cases should not issue automatically but only after 
careful consideration of the traditional equitable principles for issuing an injunction.  Id. at 
391-94.  These principles require a plaintiff to demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered irre-
parable injury; (2) that remedies at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) 
that the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and the defendant weigh in favor of 
granting a remedy in equity; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a 
permanent injunction.  Id. at 391. 
 In the aftermath of eBay, lower courts have similarly concluded that injunctive relief 
should not presumptively issue in copyright actions.  See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 
68, 74-83 (2d Cir. 2010); Coxcom, Inc. v. Chaffee, 536 F.3d 101, 112 (1st Cir. 2008); Petter 
Letterese and Assocs. v. World Institute of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287, 1323 
(11th Cir. 2008); Chrisopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 
2007).  While this change in the standards for issuing injunctive relief is commendable, it 
is unlikely to produce the type of radical shift being advocated in this Article. 
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(B) The infringer reasonably and in good faith believed that 
the use was a fair use or only involved the taking of unpro-
tected elements of the copyright owner’s work; 
(C) The cost of negotiating a license for the use of the plain-
tiff’s work was prohibitively expensive under the circums-
tances.
 The revised version continues to make the granting of injunctive 
relief a discretionary decision on the part of a judge. It simply cor-
rects for the current bias in the jurisprudence in favor of awarding 
injunctive relief to successful copyright plaintiffs. Instead, courts are 
instructed to consciously weigh the societal interests in favor of an 
injunction against the interests in permitting the defendant to con-
tinue using the plaintiff’s copyrighted work. In exercising this discre-
tion, courts are asked to focus on considerations that go to the heart 
of whether a property or liability rule should apply: whether from a 
societal standpoint the infringing use is the type that should be al-
lowed only with the copyright owner’s consent (a property rule) or is 
the type that should be permitted without consent as long as the user 
pays reasonable compensation ordered by the court (a liability rule). 
 2.  Modifying the Section on Statutory Damages 
 Any modifications to section 504(c), the current statutory damages 
provision, would need to correct for both those aspects of the provi-
sion that give decisionmakers too much discretion and those that give 
them too little. 
 As noted in Part II, the current provision gives decisionmakers 
broad authority to award statutory damages from anywhere between 
$750 and $30,000 for each work infringed.243 Moreover, if a work is 
found to have been infringed “willfully,” a term that is undefined in 
the Act, the statutory damage award can be increased to $150,000.244
If an infringer is found to have acted “innocently,” the minimal award 
can be dropped to $200, but the Copyright Act’s notice provisions for-
bid courts to give any weight to an innocent infringement defense if 
the defendant had access to copies of the plaintiff’s work that had 
proper copyright notice.245
 The most glaring problem with these provisions is that they give 
courts virtually no guidance as to when they should award statutory 
damages that are merely compensatory and restitutionary (that is, 
actual damages and a defendant’s nonduplicative profits) and when 
they should award punitive statutory damages. As noted, this lack of 
guidance means that prospective users of copyrighted works have 
 243. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
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little basis for predicting whether, in the event they are found liable, 
they will be forced to pay merely compensatory damages or punitive 
damages. This unpredictability, in turn, tends to chill potential users, 
even if they have a reasonable belief that they are taking only ideas 
or that their use is a fair use. The problem, as detailed in Part VI, is 
that the current statutory damages provision does not instruct deci-
sionmakers to distinguish between those scenarios in which only 
compensatory damages are appropriate and those in which punitive 
damages are appropriate.  
 Section 504’s problems are compounded by the provision mandat-
ing increased statutory damages when an infringement is found to be 
“willful.” As noted in Part II, the Act does not define “willful,” and at 
least some definitions used by courts suggest that a defendant’s ac-
tion could be willful if the defendant recklessly disregarded a copy-
right owner’s rights or knew or should have known his act was in-
fringing.246 Yet, as contended in Part VI, the crucial factor affecting 
whether punitive damages are appropriate is not merely whether a 
defendant knew or should have known that he was infringing, but 
rather whether the infringement was of an egregious nature, such as 
pure piracy.247
 To correct for these problems, section 504 should be modified so 
that the default rule for statutory damages is merely compensatory 
and restitutionary damages. Further, decisionmakers should be in-
structed to award punitive damages only in those situations in which 
the deterrent value of punitive damages is clearly appropriate. 
 Section 504 also needs to be modified to correct for those situa-
tions in which the minimum statutory damage awards are unduly 
punitive. While it seems reasonable to preserve the current $750 sta-
tutory minimum since that amount will only rarely be punitive and it 
is important to preserve an incentive for copyright owners to assert 
their rights, section 504 still needs a provision that allows judges to 
award damages below this minimum in situations where the award 
of the minimum would be unduly punitive. As noted, this is most 
likely to occur when a user has used many works in a manner that is 
likely to have caused little harm to the copyright owner.248
 Finally, courts also need discretion to reduce the minimum in sit-
uations where a user has a strong innocent infringement claim, even 
if the user had access to works with copyright notice. When copyright 
notice was made optional with the Berne Convention Implementation 
Act of 1989, Congress added a section to the notice provisions that 
forbids courts from giving any evidentiary weight to a defendant’s 
 246. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.  
 248. See supra notes 101-13 and accompanying text. 
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innocent infringement defense if the defendant had access to copies of 
the plaintiff’s work that bore proper copyright notice.249 While this 
addition may have been beneficial in the sense that it gives copyright 
owners an incentive to continue using copyright notice, it is regretta-
ble in the sense that a defendant’s innocent infringement defense can 
often be credible even if the defendant had access to works with copy-
right notice. Most importantly, if a defendant reasonably and legiti-
mately believed that his use was a fair use or that he was merely tak-
ing a work’s ideas, then these defenses are no less plausible merely 
because the work contained proper notice. The current rule, however, 
forbids courts to entertain a defendant’s innocent infringement de-
fense in such scenarios for purposes of reducing the statutory damage 
award. The Act does allow for the complete remission of statutory 
damage awards when certain nonprofit entities have a good faith be-
lief that their actions constituted fair use, but this provision is li-
mited to those entities.250 The solution is for section 504 to allow de-
fendants to assert an innocent infringement defense notwithstanding 
the existence of proper notice. 
 In an attempt to incorporate all of these proposed changes, I have 
drafted proposed revisions to section 504(c). Once again, the under-
lined portions reflect the additions. To put the section in context, I 
have also reproduced section 504’s provisions for actual damages and 
a defendant’s profits. 
§ 504 Remedies for Infringement: Damages and Profits 
(a) In general. Except as otherwise provided by this title, an in-
fringer of copyright is liable for either 
(1) the copyright owner’s actual damages and any additional 
profits of the infringer, as provided by subsection (b); or
 (2) statutory damages, as provided by subsection (c).
(b) Actual damages and profits. The copyright owner is entitled 
to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of 
the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attri-
butable to the infringement and are not taken into account in 
computing the actual damages. In establishing the infringer’s prof-
its, the copyright owner is required to present proof only of the in-
fringer’s gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his 
or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable 
to factors other than the copyrighted work.
(c) Statutory damages. 
(1) Except as provided by clauses (2) and (3) of this subsection, 
the copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment 
is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an 
award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the 
action, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer 
 249. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 44 (1988). 
 250. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006). 
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is liable individually, or for which any two or more infringers are 
liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less that $750 or more 
than $30,000 as the court considers just. For the purposes of this 
subsection, all the parts of a compilation or derivative work con-
stitute one work. An award of statutory damages under this sub-
section should reasonably approximate the amount a plaintiff 
would have received had the plaintiff sought actual damages and 
any additional profits of the infringer under subsection (b). In a 
case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the 
court finds, that the awarding of minimal statutory damages for 
multiple infringements will result in an award that is unreason-
ably punitive, a court may in its discretion award statutory dam-
ages of a sum of less than $750 as the court deems appropriate to 
the circumstances. 
(2) Increase of maximum damage award when punitive 
damages are appropriate: If the copyright owner sustains the 
burden of proving, and the court finds, that the nature of the in-
fringer’s action justifies an award to punish the infringer and to 
deter others from engaging in similar conduct, a court in its dis-
cretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of 
not more than $150,000. The awarding of punitive damages 
should be reserved for situations where the infringement is deli-
berate and egregious, most typically when a defendant knowing-
ly usurps a financially significant market that is customarily ex-
ploited by copyright owners and had no plausible belief that the 
use was a fair use or consisted of taking only unprotected ele-
ments of the copyright owner’s work.
(3) Reduction of minimum damage award for innocent in-
fringement: In a case where the infringer sustains the burden 
of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware 
and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an 
infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce 
the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. 
The provisions in Section 401(d) and 402(d) shall not preclude a 
court from giving evidentiary weight to a defendant’s innocent in-
fringement defense if the defendant sustains the burden of prov-
ing, and the court finds, that the defendant believed and had
reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the copy-
righted work was either a fair use under section 107 [17 U.S.C. § 
107] or merely consisted of taking unprotected elements under 
section 102(b) [17 U.S.C. § 102(b)] from the plaintiff’s work. The 
court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an in-
fringer believed or had reasonable grounds for believing that his 
or her use of the copyrighted work was a fair use under section 
107 [17 U.S.C. § 107], if the infringer was: (i) an employee or 
agent of a nonprofit educational institution, library, or archives 
acting within the scope of his or her employment who, or such in-
stitution, library, or archives itself, which infringed by reproduc-
ing the work in copies or phonorecords; or (ii) a public broadcast-
ing entity which or a person who, as a regular part of the non-
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profit activities of a public broadcasting entity (as defined in sub-
section (g) of section 118 [17 U.S.C. § 118]) infringed by perform-
ing a published nondramatic literary work or by reproducing a 
transmission program embodying a performance of such a work.  
C.  The Constitutional Fix: Due Process or Free Speech Limits on  
Statutory Damages
 The Constitution is a rather drastic tool with which to solve this 
relatively small problem. It would undoubtedly be preferable to fix 
the problem legislatively. But that option may not be politically feas-
ible. Indeed, to the extent that Congress has been captured by the 
copyright industries, it is unlikely to take any actions that will re-
duce damage awards to copyright owners.251 In fact, all amendments 
to the current Act’s statutory damages regime have gone in the oppo-
site direction: to increase the amounts that copyright owners can re-
cover. When the 1976 Act was first enacted, statutory damage 
awards ranged from a minimum of $250 to a maximum of $10,000, 
with courts permitted to increase the award up to $50,000 for willful 
infringements.252 In the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 
1988, Congress doubled the award amounts to $500 to $20,000 for 
ordinary infringements and $100,000 for willful infringements.253 A 
decade later, in the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages 
Improvement Act of 1999, Congress increased statutory damages an 
additional 50% creating the current range for ordinary infringements 
of $750 to $30,000 and the maximum amount for willful infringe-
ments of $150,000.254 The Digital Theft Deterrence Act was enacted 
 251. See Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright Duration Extension and the Dark Heart of Cop-
yright, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 655, 655 (1996) (noting that “[a]gain and again, Con-
gress has been willingly captured by the publishing and motion picture industries”); Niva 
Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a 
Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 375 (2005) (stating that the “legislative 
process is captured by the content industries”). See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RI-
CHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 25 (2004) 
(stating that the increase in the legal protection of intellectual property since 1976 may be 
explained by political forces and ideological currents “abetted by interest-group pressures 
that favor originators of intellectual property over copiers”); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COP-
YRIGHT 14 (2001) (noting that “[c]opyright is now seen as a tool for copyright owners to use 
to extract all the potential commercial value from works of authorship”). 
 252. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1976) (superseded). 
 253. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, §10, 102 
Stat. 2853, 2860 (1988). Stephanie Berg contends that this increase was intended to re-
ward copyright owners who registered their works and were therefore eligible to seek sta-
tutory damages. Berg, supra note 42, at 301. This reward may have helped mollify Ameri-
cans copyright owners who may have felt disadvantaged by another aspect of the Berne 
Convention Implementation Act which allowed owners of certain foreign works to bring 
infringements actions without registering their copyrights, a privilege that is not available 
to American copyright owners. Id. at 301. Commentators also say the change was intended 
to track inflation. Id.; Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 70, at 458 n.76. 
 254. Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. 
L. No. 106-160, § 2, 113 Stat. 1774, 1774 (1999). 
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against a backdrop of rampant internet piracy, and the legislative 
history reveals a clear congressional intent in support of punitive sta-
tutory damages.255 In subsequent years Congress has proposed mak-
ing statutory damages even more onerous, although nothing has yet 
been enacted.256
 If Congress is in fact captured by the copyright industries, then 
any reining-in of statutory damages is likely to occur only through 
judicially imposed limits implied from the Constitution. Of course, 
courts should always be reluctant to use their power of judicial re-
view to trump policies enacted by the politically accountable 
branches. But since copyright impinges on speech, and a healthy po-
litical process can exist only when speech is robust and uninhibited, 
this is arguably one area where judicial intervention is justified.257
Thus, it is worth considering whether any provision in the Constitu-
tion might require modifying statutory damages to protect speech 
interests. The two most likely bases for constitutional checks on sta-
tutory damages are the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and 
the First Amendment Free Speech Clause. Each of these is  
explored below. 
 1.  Due Process Limits on Statutory Damages 
 Since the primary problem with statutory damages is their poten-
tially punitive nature, courts and commentators have understanda-
bly looked to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as the best 
source of a constitutional restraint.258 Starting in 1996 with BMW of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore,259 the Supreme Court has made it clear 
that “grossly excessive” punitive damage awards can violate the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.260 Although the cases 
decided by the Supreme Court so far have concerned state imposed 
 255. H.R. REP. NO. 106-216, at 6 (1999) (stating that “[c]ourts and juries must be able 
to render awards that deter others from infringing intellectual property rights” and that it 
was therefore “important that the cost of infringement substantially exceed the costs  
of compliance”). 
 256. See, e.g., LIBRARY COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE ET AL., THE THREAT POSED BY INFLATED 
STATUTORY DAMAGES (2008), http://www.arl.org/bm~doc/jointparties-sec104cmts.pdf (criti-
cizing H.R. 4279, 2009 legislation which would have weakened the rule established in the 
Copyright Act of 1976 that plaintiffs may only receive one statutory damage for each  
work infringed).  
 257. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“There 
may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legisla-
tion appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution . . . .”). 
 258. See, e.g., Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 70, at 464-97; Barker, supra note 
136, at 537-49. 
 259. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). The Gore decision came on the heels of earlier Supreme Court 
decisions which suggested that there might be due process limits on excessive punitive 
damages. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453-54 (1993); 
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).  
 260. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568. 
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punitive damages and thus have implicated only the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, there is little reason to think that 
the Court would impose different rules under the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause for excessive penalties imposed by the  
federal government.261
 The justices have not been entirely clear as to why excessive dam-
age awards violate due process. Some justices, such as Justice Ste-
vens, have suggested that the problem is primarily procedural: indi-
viduals must have “fair notice” of not only what conduct is sanctiona-
ble but also of “the severity of the penalty that a State may im-
pose.”262 But in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Campbell 263 Justice Kennedy indicated that excessive damages can 
also violate substantive due process. “To the extent an award is 
grossly excessive,” he explained, “it furthers no legitimate purpose 
and constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property.”264
 In the Gore decision, the first case to find excessive punitive dam-
ages unconstitutional, the Court announced three guideposts for de-
termining whether a punitive damage award is unconstitutional: (1) 
the “degree of reprehensibility” of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the 
disparity between the actual and potential harm suffered by the 
plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference be-
tween the punitive damages awarded by the jury and “civil penalties 
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”265
 In State Farm, the Court provided further clarification of how 
these guideposts should be applied. The Court specified that the de-
gree of reprehensibility was the “most important indicium of the rea-
sonableness of a punitive damages award” and listed factors for 
courts to consider in weighing a defendant’s reprehensibility.266 Fac-
tors that could be relevant in the copyright context included whether 
a defendant’s conduct “involved repeated actions or was an isolated 
incident” and whether “the harm was the result of intentional malice, 
trickery, or deceit.”267 And although the Court said it declined “to im-
pose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot ex-
ceed,” it couldn’t help but add that “few awards exceeding a single-
digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages . . . will sa-
tisfy due process.”268
 261. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc., v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. 532 U.S. 424, 430 n.3 
(2001) (suggesting that the standards for the constitutionality of punitive damage awards 
would be the same for both federal and state laws). 
 262. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574. 
 263. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 264. Id. at 417 (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 42 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)). 
 265. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575. 
 266. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575). 
 267. Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576-77). 
 268. Id. at 425. 
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 Given that copyright statutory damages sometimes far exceed a 
single-digit ratio between punitive and actual damages—particularly 
when multiple works have been infringed—defendants in lower 
courts began challenging awards as violative of due process.269 Com-
mentators have also seized onto Supreme Court jurisprudence as the 
logical vehicle for reining in excessive statutory damage awards.270
 Thus far, litigants challenging such awards on due process 
grounds have not been notably successful.271 Two obstacles have 
usually stood in their way. Most importantly, courts have pointed out 
that copyright statutory damages are qualitatively different from  
punitive damages awarded in state tort actions. Unlike punitive 
damages, which seemingly have no upward limit, copyright statutory 
damages have clearly articulated upward caps bearing Congress’ en-
dorsement.272 Thus, by definition, the damages lack a level of arbitra-
riness that is often present in punitive damage awards in tort  
cases.273 Courts have also focused on the fact that the Supreme Court 
in both Gore and State Farm was particularly troubled by the fact 
that the states were using punitive damages to punish defendants for  
nationwide conduct and not just for tortious conduct within the 
state.274 But, as lower courts have rightfully observed, sanctions im-
 269. See, e.g., Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 586-88 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (rejecting due process challenge to copyright statutory damage award); Video 
Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1017 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that due process 
concerns require that a trial court “provide some explanation of the factual findings that 
underlie” a decision to award greater than minimum statutory damages); Westbound 
Records, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publ’g, Inc., No. 3:05-0155, 2009 WL 943516, at *2-3 (M.D. 
Tenn. Apr. 3, 2009) (upholding punitive copyright statutory damage award against consti-
tutional challenge); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Lindor, No. CV-05-1095(DGT), 2006 WL 
3335048, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2006) (granting leave to amend answer to plead a due 
process defense to a statutory damage award); Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 
302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 459-60 (D. Md. 2004) (rejecting due process challenge). 
 270. See, e.g., Barker, supra note 136, at 537-59; Blaine Evanson, Due Process in Statu-
tory Damages, 3 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 601, 632-37 (2005); Samuelson & Wheatland, su-
pra note 70, at 464-97. 
 271. See, e.g., Zomba Enters., 491 F.3d at 586-88 (rejecting due process challenge to 
copyright statutory damage award); Westbound Records, No. 3:05-0155, 2009 WL 943516, 
at *2-3 (same); Lowry’s Reports, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 459-60 (same). But see Bridgeport Mu-
sic, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publ’g, 507 F. 3d 470, 486-90 (6th Cir. 2007) (invalidating high 
punitive damage award in common law copyright case); Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenen-
baum, No. 07cv1146-NG, 2010 WL 2705499, at *30 (D. Mass. July 9, 2010) (reducing a 
statutory damage award that the court found to be grossly excessive in violation of the Due 
Process Clause); In re Napster, Inc., No. C MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 04-1671 MHP, 2005 WL 
1287611, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2005) (acknowledging that excessive statutory damage 
awards might violate due process). 
 272. See Lowry’s Reports, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 460. 
 273. Id. at 460 (stating that “[t]he unregulated and arbitrary use of judicial power that 
the Gore guideposts remedy is not implicated in Congress’ carefully crafted and reasonably 
constrained [copyright] statute”). 
 274. Id. at 459-60; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S 408, 
421 (2003) (stating that a state generally does not “have a legitimate concern in imposing 
punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the State’s 
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posed under copyright law do not raise any of these state comity con-
cerns because copyright law applies nationwide.275
 Still, commentators have argued that these are distinctions with-
out a difference and that the Supreme Court’s due process jurispru-
dence does and should limit copyright statutory damage awards.276
Given the broad range of statutory damages and the lack of guidance 
given to fact finders in applying these guidelines, it is hard to con-
tend that the scheme Congress created is so carefully designed that it 
should be immune from due process review.277 Due process limits on 
statutory damages also seem especially appropriate in cases of mul-
tiple infringements, where even minimum statutory damages awards 
can result in massively excessive damages.278
 Yet, even if the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence should 
apply to statutory damages, it is hardly clear that it would cure all 
that ails the current statutory damages regime. The Supreme Court’s 
due process jurisprudence has been aimed primarily at punitive 
damage awards that are wildly excessive. But, as I argued above, the 
core problem with the copyright statutory damages regime is not that 
it can produce massively excessive punitive damage awards, but that 
it can produce punitive damage awards at all in cases where liability 
rules are appropriate. Thus, any constitutional solution must not on-
ly limit grossly excessive awards but must also bar any punitive 
damage awards in scenarios where only compensatory and restitu-
tionary damages are appropriate. Because any constitutional check 
must regulate punitive damage awards in general, and not just gross-
ly excessive awards, courts are better off looking to the First 
Amendment as a constitutional limitation on statutory damages. 
 2.  Free Speech Limits on Statutory Damages 
 To begin with, it is important to concede that any First Amend-
ment claim would likely be an uphill battle. While the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged that copyright law implicates the First 
Amendment, it has largely dismissed any First Amendment attacks 
on the ground that copyright law already has the built-in free speech 
safeguards of the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doc-
jurisdiction”); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996) (stating that the eco-
nomic penalties imposed by a state “must be supported by the State’s interest in protecting 
its own consumers and its own economy”).
 275. Lowry’s Reports, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 459-60. 
 276. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 70, at 491-97. 
 277. Id. at 495. 
 278. Id. at 494-95; see also Parker v. Times Warner Entm’t, 331 F.3d 13, 21-22 (2d Cir. 
2003) (assuming that due process limitations would apply to excessive statutory damages 
resulting from aggregated awards). 
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trine.279 The first hurdle in any First Amendment argument would be 
to convince a judge that these free speech accommodations should not 
render all First Amendment attacks on copyright futile. This may not 
be an easy argument but it is a sound one. 
 Indeed, as already discussed in Part VI, the Supreme Court’s logic 
for immunizing copyright law from First Amendment scrutiny makes 
sense only if the so-called free speech safeguards the Court refers to 
are actually effective.280 But if, as previously argued, the specter of 
punitive damages under the statutory damages regime discourages 
users from effectively utilizing these safeguards, the logic of with-
holding First Amendment scrutiny dissipates.281
 If a court were willing to entertain a First Amendment challenge 
to the statutory damages regime, the issue would be whether the im-
pact these damages have on free speech interests is more than the 
First Amendment can tolerate.282 This, in effect, is what the courts do 
when analyzing content-neutral laws.283 The problem in these in-
stances is not that the government is censoring speech because it 
does not like the message.284 Instead, the problem is that even a con-
tent-neutral government action can sometimes harm speech interests 
in an intolerable manner. For instance, if the government banned all 
leafleting in order to prevent the accumulation of litter, the law might 
be content-neutral and have a legitimate purpose, but it would still have 
an intolerable impact on a vital means of grassroots communication.285
 279. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (stating that, to the extent that copy-
right laws might “raise First Amendment concerns, copyright’s built-in free speech safe-
guards are generally adequate to address them”); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (concluding that, “[i]n view of the First Amendment pro-
tections already embodied in the Copyright Act’s distinction between copyrightable expres-
sion and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment 
traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use 
to create what amounts to a public figure exception to copyright”). 
 280. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra notes 81-116 and accompanying text. 
 282. See generally Alan E. Garfield, The Case for First Amendment Limits on Copyright 
Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1169, 1201-06 (2007) (describing when a private party’s assertion 
of copyright rights has an intolerable impact on speech). 
 283. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 58 
(1987) (stating that, with regard to content-neutral restrictions on speech, “[t]here is a 
strong correlation in practice . . . between the extent to which a challenged law actually 
interferes with the opportunities for free expression and the Court’s use of . . . strict, in-
termediate, and deferential standards of review,” with strict review being used for regula-
tion with a “severe effect” on expression). 
 284. Garfield, supra note 282, at 1189-96 (discussing instances where copyrights are 
being used to censor speech). 
 285. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160-62 (1939); see also City of Ladue v. 
Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 48-51 (1994) (finding ban on residential lawn signs unconstitutional 
notwithstanding a city’s legitimate content-neutral interest in promoting aesthetics); Mar-
tin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143-44, 149 (1943) (finding ban on all door-to-door 
solicitations unconstitutional notwithstanding a city’s legitimate content-neutral interests 
in protecting privacy and safety). 
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 In the statutory damage context, we must start with the recogni-
tion that the First Amendment accepts the general legitimacy of cop-
yright law notwithstanding the restraint it places on speech. Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that copyright law, by giving au-
thors an incentive to produce new works, is often an “engine of free 
expression.”286 Thus, the issue is not whether all of copyright law is 
unconstitutional, but rather whether the existing statutory damages 
regime raises free speech concerns. 
 For the most part, First Amendment jurisprudence does not focus 
on the speech impact of excessive damage awards. The one notable 
exception is in the area of defamation law, where the Court specifi-
cally established rules for when punitive and presumed damages may 
be awarded.287 There, as here, the Court was concerned that the 
prospect of punitive damages would unduly chill speech.288
 The relevant question is whether the impact of statutory damages 
on speech interests is unacceptable. Imagine, for example, a city that 
charged a $100,000 fee to use a public park for a rally. While the gov-
ernment may be permitted to charge a reasonable fee for the use of 
its facilities, such an exorbitant sum to use a traditional public forum 
(even though unrelated to the content of the speaker’s message) 
would be more than the First Amendment could bear.289 Similarly, if 
the specter of punitive-like statutory damages chills more speech 
than the First Amendment could tolerate, then a court could require 
the statutory damages regime to be modified in the ways suggested 
in this Article. Lower courts would therefore have to invalidate ex-
cessive statutory damages that unduly chill speech, especially in cir-
cumstances where the threat of punitive damages discourages users 
from asserting plausible fair uses or the takings of arguably unpro-
tected ideas. Congress could help alleviate the burden on courts in 
 286. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
 287. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974) (forbidding recovery 
of presumed or punitive damages by a defamation plaintiff when the defamatory remark 
concerns a matter of public concern unless the plaintiff proves that the defendant acted 
with actual malice). But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 
749, 758-59 (1985) (permitting the recovery of presumed and punitive damages without 
proof of actual malice when a defamation action is brought by a private figure and concerns 
a matter of private concern). 
 288. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 757-59 (explaining why limits on the recovery of puni-
tive damages are necessary to prevent the chilling of speech on matters of public concern). 
 289. In invalidating a license fee applied to public distribution of religious literature, 
the Supreme Court said that “[f]reedom of speech, freedom of the press, [and] freedom of 
religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way.” Murdock v. 
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943). Professor Van Houweling has said that the reach 
of this language is unclear, but notes that some lower courts have read the case as insisting 
that speech permit fees be no more than nominal to preserve speech opportunities of poorly 
financed speakers. Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 1535, 1552-53 (2005).  
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policing First Amendment violations by modifying the Copyright Act 
in the manner suggested in Part VII.B on a “legislative fix.”  
VIII.  CONCLUSION
 Most intentional torts, such as fraud or battery, have no societal 
benefit and are in fact harmful. Society has every reason to structure 
tort law to discourage such actions, not only by compensating the vic-
tims but also by subjecting the tortfeasors to punitive damages. 
 But the societal consequences of the tortious act of copyright in-
fringement are more ambiguous. While there are some instances, 
such as pure unadulterated piracy, that may have no socially re-
deeming aspects, there are other types of infringement that involve 
the creation of new socially valuable works. 
 The key to properly calibrating copyright damages is to have a 
spectrum of options that strike a balance in each instance between 
the relative harm to a copyright owner and the relative benefit to so-
ciety created by the activity being sanctioned. At one end of the spec-
trum, for egregious acts of piracy, punitive damages awards should 
not only be allowed but also encouraged to deter the illegal actions. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum are acts that have strong social 
benefits and cause little or no harm to copyright owners. In these in-
stances, it may be appropriate to immunize users completely from 
any liability, as is currently the case for fair uses or uses that take 
only unprotected ideas. Finally, in the middle of the spectrum are 
uses which are socially beneficial but which sufficiently exploit a cop-
yright owner’s legitimate markets to render it inappropriate to deny 
the copyright owner any compensation.  
 A remedial regime that is properly calibrated to account for all 
three of these scenarios is most likely to ensure that copyright law 
continues to strike the proper balance between a copyright owner’s 
legitimate expectations of compensation and the public’s interest in 
accessing and using copyrighted works. Such a regime will also see to 
it that copyright law does not unduly trench upon free speech inter-
ests by ensuring that copyright’s built-in free speech safeguards of 
fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy exist in practice and not 
just theory. Only then will copyright law be the true “engine of free 
expression” the Supreme Court imagines it to be.290
 290. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558. 
